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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS INFLUENCING JAPANESE WOMEN’S
DECISION ABOUT CHILDBEARING IN POST-BUBBLE JAPAN
by
Rebecca Richko
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Steven Heine, Major Professor
For the past twenty-five years, Japan’s population decline has been a domestic and global
concern. A common discourse on the issue of Japan’s low birth rate tends to focus on the
role of women, specifically indicating that women should change their behavior to
prioritize motherhood. This thesis argues that Japan’s low birth rate is the result of a nexus
of social and economic influences that are experienced in contemporary society. In order
to provide a nuanced analysis of the influences on a woman’s childbearing decision,
motivators of and challenges to population growth will be explored. The dynamic struggle
that women experience from the internalized stress of deciding about childbearing while
coping with external factors from the community, government, and corporate sector is
divided into four categories. The conditions caused by the interaction of these different
factors contributes to consistent decline in the birth rate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Complexity of the Birth Rate Crisis in Japan
For the past twenty-five years, Japan’s population decline has been a domestic and
global concern. The national birth rate is steadily decreasing and Japan’s Ministry of
Health, Labour, and Welfare predicts that, without adequate intervention, the population
will fall to 86.7 million by 2060, a loss of about 32% of its current 127 million population. 1
One of the main concerns of the low birth rate discussed by many economists is the lack
of replenishment to the workforce population, defined as the population between twenty to
sixty-four years old, in the near future. 2 The workforce is depended on to generate the
revenue needed to fund government programs, such as social security. With a third of the
population projected to be over sixty-five years old in 2050, there is a greater necessity for
these programs. 3 Many economists have found that the large public medical expenditure,
combined with the lack of government revenue produced by the decreased workforce,

1

National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Department of Population
Dynamics Research Japan, Vital Statistics: Population Projections for Japan (Japan
Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, 2012).
2

Robert Dekle, “The Deteriorating Fiscal Situation and an Aging Population,” in
Structural Impediments to Growth in Japan, eds. Magnus Blomström, Jennifer Corbett,
Fumio Hayashi, and Anil Kashyap (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 71-87;
Toshihiro Ihori, Ryuta Ray Kato, Masumi Kawade, and Shun-ichiro Bessho, “Public Debt
and Economic Growth in an Aging Japan,” in Tackling Japan's Fiscal Challenges:
Strategies to Cope with High Public Debt and Population Aging, eds. Keimei Kaizuka and
Anne O. Krueger (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan/International Monetary
Fund, 2006), 30-68; and Thomas F. Cargill, and Takayuki Sakamoto, Japan Since 1980
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
3

Dekle, “The Deteriorating Fiscal Situation and an Aging Population”; and Louis D.
Hayes, Introduction to Japanese Politics (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 205.

1

could potentially create a huge national debt in the coming decades. 4 Therefore, Japan
needs to stabilize the national birth rate in order to increase its future workforce population
and avoid financial crisis. In an attempt to address this concern, some scholars focus on
issues related to immigration. Because this thesis focuses on factors influencing Japanese
women’s childbearing decision, however, matters related to immigration fall outside the
scope of research.
Discussion of Japan’s low birth rate tends to focus on the role of women,
specifically indicating that women should change their behavior to prioritize motherhood
rather than a career or other goals. 5 This stance is supported in large part by traditionalists
who remain unsympathetic to, or lack concern for, the societal disincentives for women
who are deciding whether or not to have children. 6 Many Japanese women, in fact, do wish
to become mothers but are met with obstacles that, when stacked together, are too great to
overcome. 7 Some of these obstacles, whether in a woman’s professional or personal life,
will be analyzed in the coming chapters.

4

Dekle, “The Deteriorating Fiscal Situation and an Aging Population”; and Ihori, et al.,
“Public Debt and Economic Growth in an Aging Japan.”
5

Setsu Shigematsu, Scream from the Shadows: The Women's Liberation Movement in
Japan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); and Sharon Sievers, “Women
in China, Japan, and Korea,” in Women in Asia: Restoring Women to History, eds. Barbara
Ramusack and Sharon Sievers (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999).
6

Susan Holloway, Women and Family in Contemporary Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010); and Justin McCurry, “Japanese Minister Wants ‘Birth-giving
Machines’, aka Women, to Have More Babies,” The Guardian, January 28, 2007, accessed
October 17, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jan/29/japan.justinmccurry.
7

National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Department of Population
Dynamics Research Japan, The Fourteenth Japanese National Fertility Survey in 2010:

2

There is a noticeable struggle that women go through in Japan that is not amply
discussed in scholarly research or popular commentary. The ideal for women to become
mothers is supported by public discourse and is sought after by many women. When faced
with the demands of contemporary society, however, a growing number of women find
motherhood to be an unfeasible option, even though the desire for bearing children remains.
The struggle between the ideal and the alternative situations that women face represents
the pressure to live up to the ideal of becoming mothers without having the necessary
conditions or tools to do so. While parts of this research focus on the struggle that women
go through in their childbearing decision, the focus remains on the factors that influence
their choice, rather than the associated psychology of decision-making.
This thesis argues that Japan’s low birth rate is the result of a nexus of social and
economic influences that are experienced in contemporary society. The population decline
is not reducible to any single factor. It encompasses internal factors which stem from a
person, family or community as well as external factors from the government and corporate
sector that generates the stress of deciding whether or not to have children. The conditions
caused by the interaction of these different factors contributes to consistent decline in the
birth rate.
My analysis of the influences on a woman’s decision about childbearing is based
on two fundamental distinctions: (1) the ideal female gender model versus alternative
gender roles; and (2) internal versus external influences. The ideal gender model
encourages women to achieve motherhood at a young age, usually in their twenties, and

Attitudes toward Marriage and Family among Japanese Singles (Japan Ministry of Health,
Labour, and Welfare, 2010), 18.

3

shortly after they are married. 8 As young, married mothers, women are expected to stop
working outside of the home and devote themselves to the household. 9 It is beyond my
scope of research to fully trace the origins of the ideal gender model, but this formula seems
to have been established since the late 1800s.
Due to the idealized gender role and societal expectations for women, marriage and
childbirth are almost synonymous in Japanese culture. The National Institute of Population
and Social Security Research stated in a survey report from 2010:
Looking at the motives of couples who eventually decided to get married,
pregnancy (“became pregnant”) was the most frequently chosen response
among couples with wives younger than 25 years old, which accounted for
50.0%. For couples with wives 25 years or older, the proportion of
respondents who chose “became pregnant” was lower, and more than half
chose “felt it was the appropriate age to get married. 10
After twenty-five years old, the percentage of premarital pregnancies as a reason for
marriage significantly decreases (from 50% to 12.4%). 11 Instead, marriages formed after a
person is twenty-five years old are credited to the societal pressure for a woman to marry
in her twenties, which is followed by the expectation to have children within a couple of

8

Holloway, Women and Family in Contemporary Japan; Lynne Nakano, “Single Women
in Marriage and Employment Markets in Japan” in Capturing Contemporary Japan:
Differentiation and Uncertainty, eds. Satsuki Kawano, Glenda Susan Roberts, and Susan
Orpett Long (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014), 163-182; and Sievers,
“Women in China, Japan, and Korea.”
9

Ibid.

10

National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Department of Population
Dynamics Research Japan, The Fourteenth Japanese National Fertility Survey in 2010:
Marriage Process and Fertility of Japanese Married Couples (Japan Ministry of Health,
Labour, and Welfare, 2010b), 3.
11

Ibid.

4

years of marriage. 12 The percentage of married women without children is small, reflecting
the expectancy of children after marriage. However, the frequency of married women
without children is gradually becoming more common. Women are getting married at older
ages than before, leaving less years available to them to have children. 13 Because of this,
as Fumie Kumagai says, “Japanese married women who do not bear children comprise two
contrasting groups: those who do not want to bear children, and those who are unable to
do so.” 14 Thus, delayed marriage is directly related to the birth rate and may be discussed
in this thesis when deemed relevant.
In contrast, alternative gender roles reflect the adaptations made by Japanese
women in order to overcome challenges in contemporary society. These roles are more
inclusive of the variety of lifestyles that women participate in. Some of the conditions that
produce these alternative gender roles include the high expectation of mothers to provide
quality, hands-on childcare, the economic cost of having and raising children as well as
interest in professional pursuits. Thus, alternative gender roles include the positions that
women actually find themselves in, whether they are working towards becoming mothers
may lack interest in motherhood. A multifaceted approach will be used to assess the

12

Holloway, Women and Family in Contemporary Japan; Nakano, “Single Women in
Marriage and Employment Markets in Japan”; and Sievers, “Women in China, Japan, and
Korea.”
13

Holloway, Women and Family in Contemporary Japan, 4; and National Institute of
Population and Social Security Research, Marriage Process and Fertility of Japanese
Married Couples, 2.
14

Fumie Kumagai, Families in Japan: Changes, Continuities, and Regional Variations
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2008), 15.

5

contrast between the ideal gender model and the contemporary social reality of alternative
gender roles.
This paper is also framed by the binary relationship of internal and external factors
affecting a woman’s decision of whether or not to have a child. Internal factors deal with
the issues that are internalized by women, the emotional struggle of the high exposure to
the ideal gender model and the recognized implications of the alternative gender roles.
These influences arise from the interior dialogue that women experience between their
personal desires and the values impressed upon them from the external factors. External
influences are governmental public and economic policies and corporate programs, which
try to deal with the population decline. In order to provide a nuanced analysis of the
influences on a woman’s decision of whether or not to have a child, the following
categories will be discussed: (a) internal, individual factors; (b) internal, public factors; (c)
external, economic factors; and (d) external, institutional factors. Definitions of these
categories will be explained further in later sections.
Global Perspectives of the Birth Rate
I will use birth rates whenever possible, instead of fertility rates. Although the terms
are often used interchangeably, fertility rates and birth rates are different by definition. A
country’s fertility rate is “the average number of children a woman would bear if she
survived through the end of the reproductive age span.” 15 A fertility rate above two children

15

Leontine Alkema, Adrian Raftery, Patrick Gerland, Samuel Clark, Francois Pelletier, et
al. “Probabilistic Projections of the Total Fertility Rate for All Countries,” Demography 48
(2011): 816.

6

per woman signifies population replenishment. 16 A nation’s birth rate, however, is “the
average number of births during a year per 1,000 persons in the population.” 17 The birth
rate is the actuality of birth, while the fertility rate denotes a nation’s potential for
population growth. Because this thesis frames the topic of Japan’s low birth rate on a
societal level and the fertility rate deliberately excludes male participation in birth, the
fertility rate will not be used in the analysis. Therefore, the birth rate will be used instead,
which is a gender neutral measurement of population growth. Even though the focus is on
factors that influence a woman’s decision of whether or not to have a child in Japan, I argue
that the low birth rate is a systemic matter, and not the primary responsibility of women.
Japan is a country that exhibits both a low birth rate and long life expectancy, but
is not alone in this status. In fact, Japan is one of many countries that contributes to global
aging. According to John Traphagan and John Knight, researchers of Japan’s aging society,
“Modernization assumptions are especially evident in demographic transition theory,
according to which societies are held to move from ‘traditional’ states of high fertility and
high mortality to ‘modern’ states of low fertility and low mortality.” 18 For instance, in
2015, Somalia reported a birth rate of 40.45, Mali had a rate of 44.99, and Niger counted a

16

Leonard J. Schoppa, Race for the Exits: The Unraveling of Japan's System of Social
Protection (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), 151.
17

“The World Factbook – Country Comparison: Total Fertility Rate,” Central Intelligence
Agency, accessed October 15, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2127rank.html.
18

John W. Traphagan, and John Knight, Demographic Change and the Family in Japan's
Aging Society (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 6.

7

birth rate of 45.45 births per one thousand population, one of the highest in the world. 19
For that same year, Japan’s birth rate was only 7.93.
In contrast, developed nations, or “modern states”, experience a low birth rate and
low mortality. Most countries around the world share a similarity in that the birth rate
exhibited a bump in the 1950s and 1960s known as the baby boom, before leveling out or
declining in the 1970s and after. The United States follows the pattern of developed nations
and, with the exception of the baby boom that occurred after World War II, has consistently
maintained a birth rate between 12 and 16 births per one thousand population since the
1970s. As of 2015, the birth rate for the United States stood around 12.49. 20 The history of
France’s birth rate is very similar. Currently at 12.38, France’s birth rate has not fallen
below 12 births per one thousand but has not climbed above 16 since the 1970s. 21 In a more
extreme case, South Korea’s birth rate is quite significant, dropping from 43.95 in 1960 to
16.1 just twenty-five years later. 22 South Korea’s birth rate is also quite low, standing at
8.19 as of 2015. It may come as a surprise to some, however, that Germany and Japan have
competed for the world’s lowest birth rate in recent years, with Germany at 8.47, compared

19

World DataBank, “World Development Indicators – Crude Birth Rate by Country,”
accessed October 15, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CBRT.IN/
countries; and Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook – Country Comparison:
Birth Rate,” accessed October 15, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/rankorder/2054rank.html.

20

Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook.”

21

Ibid.

22

Ibid.

8

to Japan’s 7.93 of the same year. 23 The birth rates of these different countries is represented
in Figure 1.1. Thus, Japan is not an isolated case as a developed country with a low birth
rate. It is natural to anticipate a decline in Japan’s birth rate when comparing it to similar
“modern” nations.
Figure 1.1. International Comparison of National Birth Rates 24
44.99 45.45
40.45

Japan
South Korea
Germany
France
United States

12.38 12.49
7.93

8.19

Somalia
Mali

8.47

Niger

Japan’s Low Birth Rate and the Role of Women in Society
Despite this commonality shared amongst developed nations, Japan has
consistently ranked towards the bottom of the lists of global birth rates. 25 After World War
II, Japan’s birth rate also underwent a surge due to the baby boom. The trend continued

23

“Germany passes Japan to have world’s lowest birth rate – study,” BBC News, May 29,
2015, accessed October 15, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32929962; and
World DataBank, “World Development Indicators – Crude Birth Rate by Country.”
24

Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook – Country Comparison: Birth Rate.”

25

World DataBank, “World Development Indicators – Crude Birth Rate by Country”; and
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook – Country Comparison: Birth Rate.”

9

until 1973, when the birth rate was 19.4, and began to decline to its current rate of 7.93. 26
In 1990, when Japan’s birth rate was 10 births per one thousand people, Japanese officials,
academics, and media figures became intensely concerned about the low birth rate and
began investigating the lives of women in relation to the population growth. Sumiko Iwao,
a Harvard psychologist who performed extensive research on understanding Japanese
women’s attitudes and behaviors, commented on the sudden attention on, and often
criticism of, women as the cause of the birth rate decline:
To women, the figure was no surprise; to men, it came as quite a shock. The
reaction in the world of men, especially those in government, was actually
rather comical; the lowest birth rate in Japan’s history shook them for
perhaps the first time into considering women’s problems seriously. 27
The economic prosperity that Japan experienced in the postwar period was perhaps able to
hide major social problems that existed during that time. It was not until the economy began
to decline in the 1990s (when society began searching for the cause of the decline) that
those matters quickly became topics of concern. Unfortunately, consideration for women’s
problems often became synonymous with blaming them for the population decline.
The year 1990 proved a critical point for the topic of Japan’s birth rate, as there was
a concentrated effort from multiple disciplines that began in search of the cause of the low
birth rate as well as an effective method to improve population growth. Scholars honed in
on a number of sociocultural issues that affected women’s lives, isolating and identifying
these instances as the sole cause for the population decline and implying that the removal

26

Ibid.

27

Sumiko Iwao, The Japanese Woman: Traditional Image and Changing Reality (New
York: Macmillan, 1993), 130.

10

of these impediments would aid in population growth. This thesis has categorized these
singular facets of Japanese culture that influence a woman’s decision of whether or not to
have a child into different groups, which are elaborated upon in the ensuing sections of this
introduction. These categories were created based on what part of society the factor came
from, rather than whether the factors helped or hurt the birth rate. Therefore, each category
includes features that both work to improve the birth rate, as well as those that work against
it. This is designed to maintain a greater focus on the current condition of women. My
research maintains that there is a disconnect between Japan’s ideal gender model and the
existing actuality of the situation that is brought about by the impediments to achieving the
ideal. Ultimately, this thesis will show that the combination of these factors creates a
systemic issue that lowers the birth rate.
Internal Factors
The division of the four different classifications is first based on internal and
external elements. Internal factors are further split into individual and public stimuli.
Internal, individual factors refer to the personal life experiences that may guide a woman’s
decision of whether or not to have a child, and are expressed in ways that are specific to
that particular member of society. For instance, if a woman was raised by conservative
parents, she may place greater importance on getting married and having children earlier
in her life. The ideal gender model for women is included in this group, which stereotypes
women as housewives and mothers. 28 Although the ideal gender model is classified as an

28

Holloway, Women and Family in Contemporary Japan; Nakano, “Single Women in
Marriage and Employment Markets in Japan”; and Sievers, “Women in China, Japan, and
Korea.”

11

internal, individual factor, the implications of the idealized gender role are a recurring
theme throughout this thesis.
There is a variety of internal, individual factors that influences a woman’s decision
of whether or not to have a child. For example, Brenda Robb Jenike, who researches gender
ideology and transitions in social welfare in Japan, provided case studies of women who
cared for their elderly in-laws. Jenike established that the burden of elder care placed solely
on the daughter-in-law served as a deterrent for marriage and children altogether for some
women. 29 Another example can be taken from John Traphagan’s research. Traphagan
assessed how the question of co-residence between the couple and the husband’s parents
became a source of conflict both prior to and during marriage. 30 While many societal
components, like the idealized female gender role, served to encourage women to have
children in the past, the ideal gender model is currently being challenged, creating a
contradiction between the ideal that is sought after by the community and the current
actuality of society.
Internal, public factors refer to instances where the values that are associated with
the individual factors, like the idealized gender role for women, are upheld or challenged
in public spaces, mass media, and popular culture. Many television shows, books, and
movies break away from the mold set by the ideal gender model by depicting real situations

29

Brenda Robb Jenike, “Parent Care and Shifting Family Obligations in Urban Japan,” in
Demographic Change and the Family in Japan’s Aging Society (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2003).
30

John W. Traphagan, “Contesting Coresidence: Women, In-laws, and Health Care in
Rural Japan,” in Capturing Contemporary Japan: Differentiation and Uncertainty, eds.
Satsuki Kawano, Glenda Susan Roberts, and Susan Orpett Long (Honolulu: University of
Hawai’i Press, 2014), 203-228.

12

faced by women in contemporary Japanese society. Despite the fact that women are more
often being represented in entertainment in roles other than motherhood, women who do
not fulfill the idealized gender role in real life are still subject to social scrutiny. News
coverage of Japan’s low birth rate is highly suggestive of the stereotype for women to
become mothers at an “appropriate” age. Women who remain unmarried and without
children are given derogatory labels and are pushed to seek the protection of motherhood
to avoid public reproach.
External Factors
External factors deal with the effect of the governmental, corporate, and economic
establishment on its citizens. This category is further separated into economic and
institutional factors. External, economic factors address how personal and national
economies impact a woman’s decision of whether or not to have children. The economic
collapse of the 1990s, commonly referred to as the “bubble bursting,” continues to impact
contemporary Japanese society by sustaining a fear of the future. 31 Anxiety regarding
economic insecurity motivates women to pursue individual financial gain with the intended
goal of saving for marriage and raising children, which is a costly endeavor in Japan.32
This personal economic acquisition, however, results in single women choosing to
maintain their economic independence longer, rather than seeking marriage, for which they
would be compelled to leave their careers and thus rely entirely on their husband’s income.

31

National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Attitudes toward
Marriage and Family among Japanese Singles, 8.
32

Masahiro Hori, “The Expenditure on Children in Japan,” Economic and Social Research
Institute Discussion Paper Series No. 279 (Cabinet Office, 2011).

13

External, institutional factors specifically refer to the influence of the government
via public policies, and businesses through corporate environment. The responsibilities of
women in marriage, specifically in childbearing and rearing, prevent women from
professional pursuits by forcing them to choose between marriage and family or a career. 33
As mentioned previously, women have been historically expected to leave the workforce
and become a housewife and mother upon marriage. 34 Some critics remain staunch
supporters of this norm, since as few as two percent of births occur outside of the institution
of marriage. 35 The ideal is also reflected in the corporate environment, which excludes
women and upholds men as ideal employees. Patricia Boling, who specializes in Japanese
gender and public policy, claimed that the rigid corporate structure that exists in Japan is
accountable for preventing shared responsibility of childcare by both parents and
contributes to gender inequality, which creates another barrier to boosting the birth rate.36
Corporate environment upholds the ideal gender model, which can be seen in the overall

33

Kumagai, Families in Japan, 144; Jeff Kingston, Contemporary Japan: History,
Politics, and Social Change Since the 1980s (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell
Publishing, 2011), 45; and Ezra Vogel, Japan’s New Middle Class (Plymouth, UK:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), 271.

34

Hayes, Introduction to Japanese Politics; Nakano, “Single Women in Marriage and
Employment Markets in Japan”; and Tachibanaki Toshiaki, The New Paradox for
Japanese Women: Greater Choice, Greater Inequality, trans. Mary Foster (Tokyo:
International House of Japan, 2010).

35

National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Attitudes toward
Marriage and Family among Japanese Singles, 3; and Cargill and Sakamoto, Japan Since
1980.
36

Patricia Boling, “Demography, Culture, and Policy: Understanding Japan’s Low
Fertility,” Population and Development Review 34 (2008).

14

lack of female participation in the workforce and the lack of female representation in
managerial positions. 37
The Japanese government has responded to the predictions of population and
economic decline by instituting a number of public policies aimed at improving population
growth, but the birth rate continues to stagnate. 38 The policies have generally focused on
alleviating the cost of child rearing, and improving access to and quality of care facilities
for children and the elderly. 39 Scholars have conducted international comparisons of
Japan’s pro-fertility policies and found that, although similar policies were quite effective
in other nations, Japan’s public policies have been generally ineffective at boosting
population growth, indicating a greater cause for the low birth rate than poor policy
making. 40 The idealized gender role of women as homemakers and caregivers is reinforced
by gender discrimination in the corporate environment and the lack of childcare facilities
in communities. Again, there is a divergence between the ideal, for which women must
prioritize their role as mothers, and reality, in which women must face and overcome
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obstacles in the corporate environment that would allow them the economic security to
achieve the ideal.
Summary
This thesis examines the ways in which Japan’s recognized ideals and the
contemporary reality are incompatible. In doing so, I will also explore how increased
reinforcement of the ideal gender model does not improve the birth rate, but in fact
highlights the network of barriers to achieving population growth that exists in Japan.
Although specific examples of factors will be discussed in each chapter, there is not any
single feature responsible for the low birth rate. Instead, it is a seemingly inevitable
outcome to the systemic problem that forms when these factors occur simultaneously in
society. Because the current birth rate is perceived as a fertility crisis, women and the roles
they play are subject to intense scrutiny from mass media, being the target audience of
many public policies, and the focus of much academic research. By discussing the different
aspects of society that indicate that the birth rate has a systemic cause, I will then suggest
possible constructive solutions to improving population growth through greater gender
equality.
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II. INTERNAL, INDIVIDUAL FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE A WOMAN’S
DECISION ABOUT CHILDBEARING
As researchers began exploring the various ways in which society governs women’s
lives and their decision of whether or not to have children, they found a number reasons or
situations that were internalized by the individual. 41 Some generalizations are drawn from
shared characteristics, such as if a woman was raised by liberal or conservative parents, if
she is the eldest daughter, and so on. My approach categorizes these broad and varied
attributes as internal, individual factors, which highlight the internalized pressure on
women to become and prioritize their role as mothers.
The primary element that will be investigated in this chapter is the ideal female
gender model, which is a theme that will continue to be discussed throughout the thesis.
Idealized gender roles are behaviors learned and internalized by a person as appropriate to
their sex and are often determined by prevailing cultural norms. 42 Female gender
expectations have been well researched in relation to women’s role in Japan’s low birth
rate. The ideal gender model in Japan prescribes women to marry and leave the workforce
to become a homemaker and mother. 43 This is the ideal and does not reflect the reality, in
which working mothers and other alternative roles exist. Despite the fact that the ideal
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gender model in Japan serves to encourage women to have children, the birth rate has been
in steady decline since the post-war period. This apparent contradiction can be explained
through the numerous barriers that women face and the subsequent rise in the prevalence
of the alternative gender roles. As stated in the Introduction, alternative gender roles
encompass the roles that women occupy when they have yet to achieve or have no interest
in the ideal. In other words, alternative gender roles include the roles that women actually
find themselves in.
Personal Relationships as a Barrier to Having Children
The intense social pressure on women to marry and have children should facilitate
a higher birth rate, but with the birth rate so low, this is clearly not the case. So, why is the
ideal gender model no longer a strong stimulus for women to have children? Research
shows that women who adhered to the idealized gender role by becoming mothers and
homemakers, and therefore forfeited a life outside the home, are now discouraging their
female relatives from following in their footsteps. 44 This message may be direct, such as a
mother deliberately telling her daughter to postpone marriage and focus on herself, or
indirect, by a daughter seeing her female friends and relatives suffer in silence and wanting
a different life for herself. Therefore, a woman’s personal relationships may be a persuasive
feature in her decision of whether or not to have a child.
There are three main private relationships that may affect a woman’s decision about
childbearing, which are with her partner, her parents, and her potential children. The
various caregiving roles to these relationships and the related household chores that are
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demanded of women discourage some of them from having children or getting married
altogether, since the pressure for women to have children intensifies once she is married. 45
Japan is recognized as having particularly high expectations of mothers to provide quality,
hands-on child care. 46 As shown in Figure 2.1 below, in 2011, Japanese women spent an
average of three hours and thirty-five minutes a day on housework and childrearing
activities, according to a national survey. 47
Figure 2.1. Average Time Spent Daily on Household Duties
by Gender (in Minutes) in Japan, South Korea, and the United States 48
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Men spent forty-two minutes per day on the same activities. For an international
comparison, in the United States, women spent an average of two hours and nine minutes
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and men spent about one hour twenty-two minutes on household chores. 49 The statistics
for South Korea were very similar to those of Japan. 50 Men spent an average of forty-five
minutes per day, while women spent around three hours and forty-seven minutes on
household chores each day.
According to Sumiko Iwao’s study, “a larger proportion of women in the generation
that entered adulthood in the 1980s are of the opinion that husbands should share the
housework.” 51 Although women would prefer to share the household responsibilities with
their partner, this is unlikely to be the reality and may contribute to the preference for later
marriage. Wives seek greater balance with their husbands in sharing the responsibility of
household duties, though there is little formal incentive for men to engage in a stronger
role in childrearing and household duties. 52 Patricia Boling described both the isolated and
high stress nature of childrearing, which many women saw “as a daunting task that they
feel ill-prepared to meet, have few resources to help them learn, and with which their
husbands provide little help.” 53 Women witness the encumbrance placed on their mothers
and other female relations as sole caregivers for their children, which may prompt them to
postpone marriage and childbirth in order to avoid this additional burden.
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Parents are another type of personal relationship that women may consider. John
Traphagan and John Knight studied the ie, a family system where a couple’s male child
and his wife reside with his parents, and examined the traditional role of the yome, or
daughter-in-law. 54 As part of the idealized gender role for women, the yome moved in with
her husband and his parents after marriage and cared for her parent-in-laws in their old age.
Traphagan and Knight pointed out that parents are relying on their own daughters for
eldercare at an increasing rate, too. 55 Because of this fact, there is a preference for girls
among expecting couples as a form of social security. 56 In addition to the responsibilities
associated with being a mother, women are often relied upon to provide care for their aging
parents or in-laws, as well. 57 Traphagan and Knight claimed that the role of the yome is
dying out, as women’s values changed over time. In their research, Traphagan and Knight
noted that “the yome role is being renegotiated by Japanese women who either refuse to
accept the traditional responsibilities of the yome or set new conditions for fulfilling this
role.” 58
Scholars have found that Japan’s aging society is partly responsible for this shift in
values. With an average life expectancy of eighty-three years of age, women who choose
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to become a yome can presume to fulfill the role into their sixties, when they may be in
need of care themselves. 59 Many women are aware of this fact and are abandoning the
yome role entirely. Boling comments on this rising trend, stating:
…there is less pressure on a young woman to ‘go as a bride’ into a
husband’s family, and less willingness on a young woman’s part to do so,
especially given traditional expectations that she will live under her motherin-law’s thumb for decades, until her parents-in-law require her care in their
senescence. 60
Thus, women are making the personal choice not to become a yome and are receiving less
insistence from their partners and family than previous generations to do so.
The custom for a woman to move in with her husband and his parents was typically
only relevant if the husband was the heir to the household, which was usually the firstborn
son. Traphagan reported case studies where co-residence between the couple and the
husband’s parents became a topic of conflict, even among couples where the son was not
the firstborn. In Traphagan’s research, one woman said that, even though her husband was
not the eldest, she ended up taking care of his aging parents because he wanted “to do oya
kōkō (filial piety [a Confucian value that children must care for their parents]) one time
before [his parents] die.” 61 Though in actuality, the son did very little to care for his parents
and transferred the obligatory duty to his wife. She claimed that “if I knew that he was
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going to become the atotori [heir] and we would have to live with his parents, I don’t think
I would have married him.” 62
Many of the women in the case studies, whether they knew they would be
caregivers upon marriage or not, demanded a separate residence from their in-laws, which
sometimes caused marital and/or intergenerational conflict. As more women gained
increased independence, the question of co-residence became a greater point of contention.
The demand for an independent residence as a condition for marriage is becoming more
commonplace, but the desire to avoid confrontation or to “avoid living under a mother-inlaw’s thumb” may also be a cause for the decreased preference for marriage by women,
and thereby lowering the birth rate.
Another example of how personal relationships can influence a woman’s decision
about childbearing can be drawn from Brenda Robb Jenike. Jenike’s field research included
interviews with daughter-in-laws who sought out government-funded elder care options to
supplement services or relieve some of the burden of caring for their elderly in-laws. 63
Many of the situations reported that these daughters-in-law, often in their fifties or older,
had provided in-home care for their elderly in-laws for several years already, decades in
some cases. Jenike described the declining physical and psychological health of the
caregiving daughters-in-law, and the subsequent improvement to their health after statesponsored services began. Often, these women spoke of the desire for help from their
husbands and families initially but resorted to using government programs when their
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husband or other relatives would not share the responsibility. In a few of the cases, the
husband was not the eldest, but certain circumstances required his wife to take the role of
the yome. 64 Similar to the reports from Traphagan’s research, the women often claimed
that they would not have agreed to marry their husbands if they knew they would become
the primary daughter-in-law, meaning that they would take on the responsibilities of the
yome. 65 Jenike established that the encumbrance of elder care placed solely on the
daughter-in-law was great enough to warrant the need for such government programs and
served as a deterrent for marriage altogether for some women.
The Ideal Female Gender Model as a Stimulus for Childbirth
Since the Meiji era of the late 1800s, women have been the primary caregivers for
children and are compelled to maintain that role as their priority throughout their lives.
This is evident in the Meiji government-endorsed phrase ryōsai kenbo, meaning “good wife
and wise mother.” 66 Social mentalities, such as the phrase that is now considered sexist by
feminist scholars, perpetuate the ideal of women based on their sexual reproductive
capabilities, enforcing a gendered and limited role on women in Japanese society. 67
The term ryōsai kenbo originally came about in the late nineteenth century, when
Japan sought to redefine itself as a “modern” nation, as outlined by many imperialist
Western nations of the time. One of the foci for change was to reform the Japanese family
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system, and thus the role of women. Sharon Sievers, a Japanese historian, commented on
the changing role of women:
These thinkers (Fukuzawa Yukichi and Mori Arinori, among them) argued
that, since mothers were going to bear much of the responsibility for
teaching a new generation of young Japanese to be more independent and
to think critically, women would have to be treated with more respect. 68
Fukuzawa Yukichi and Mori Arinori were a couple of the founders of modern Japan who
believed that women should hold greater power, not just in their private lives, but in the
public realm, as well. The improved status of women, especially in education, became
associated with the phrase “good wife, wise mother,” designed to empower women with
greater access for their own education and greater authority in the education of children.
Ryōsai kenbo was quickly adopted and promoted by early feminists of the late nineteenth
century. 69
By the early twentieth century, however, the Japanese government took hold of the
phrase “good wife, wise mother” for their own propaganda, and “combined archaic NeoConfucian prescriptions for women’s acceptance of their gendered, limited roles in
Japanese society, and added something new: mothering as the principal gendered role of
women.” 70 At that time, the Japanese government set gender equality back significantly by
identifying and limiting women’s agency to motherhood. The government’s response to
the early feminist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was harsh,
stripping women of many of their basic rights, and severely punishing advocates of social
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change by sentencing them to prison or death. 71 Sievers remarked on the change in the
meaning of ryōsai kenbo:
If the original intent of ‘good wife, wise mother’ had been to justify
increasing education for women, and by extension, greater public
engagement in political issues on the basis of their increased responsibility
in the family, the state’s version represented an effort to keep women in
their places, at home. 72
Although the phrase “good wife, wise mother” had feminist beginnings, the government’s
version has survived more prominently, manipulating the ideal of Japanese women today
by confining women to homely duties and restricting their pursuit of professional and
political activities.
Although it blurs the line between internal, individual factors and internal, public
factors, it is necessary to briefly mention the primary group that supports the ideal gender
model. Conservatives are strong supporters of this conventional view in Japan, especially
in the political arena, with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party among some of the most
notable proponents. Some of today’s older, male conservative politicians utilize their
access and visibility in mass media to blame women as consciously and purposefully
preventing population growth, unsympathetic or unaware of the challenges that contribute
to women’s struggle in deciding whether or not to have a child. Often, these challenges
result in the choice being made for a woman, where economic, professional, or personal
reasons may cause her to postpone or remove marriage from her life course. Today, most
outspoken traditionalists are not supported by the majority of the population and are often
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penalized for their actions. Despite these consequences, conservatives strengthen the
gendered and limited view of women by continuing to criticize them in relation to the low
birth rate. Although the essence of the idealized female gender role seeks to increase
population growth, such uninformed reinforcement serves to alienate women further from
the ideal, does not aid in removing the impediments that women encounter, and only serves
to contribute to the internal struggle experienced by women. More direct issues related to
the internal, public factors will be presented in the next chapter.
Research shows that many Japanese women do want to become mothers. 73
According to a 2010 survey, the desired number of children has increased slightly in the
past five years among never-married women (to 2.12 children), yet decreased slightly
among men (to 2.04 children). 74 This would suggest, as Susan Holloway, a Child
Development and Education scholar whose focus is on Japanese mothers and children, said
so well, “that most women in Japan as elsewhere would like to become mothers if societal
conditions permitted them to have children and to live a full, satisfying life.” 75
Summary
The Meiji ideal of “good wife, wise mother” has had a lasting influence on Japanese
society in terms of how women are valued and what roles they are presumed to uphold. In
describing the enduring effect of “good wife, wise mother,” Kathleen Uno said, “a
transmuted vision of women that often emphasized their difference from men as
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homebound wives and mothers continued to influence state policies toward welfare,
education, employment, sexuality, and reproduction at least until the late 1980s.” 76 In
contrast to the progressive intentions of ryōsai kenbo, the conservative government of the
Meiji era changed the meaning of the phrase to create an ideal of women based on their
sexual reproductive capabilities, enforcing a gendered and limited role on women. This
continues to affect the ideal gender model of Japanese women today by coaxing women to
prioritize their caregiving roles to their husbands, children, and parents. Yet, the burden of
these roles is giving cause for women to delay marriage and childbirth. A woman’s
personal relationships may be a powerful factor in her decision about childbearing that is
neutralizing the intense societal pressure to conform to the idealized female gender role.
The burden of caregiving to husband, children, parents, and in-laws that is placed on
women is great enough to discourage them from having children, and in some cases from
getting married in the first place.
The ideal gender model pushes women to have children while a woman’s personal
relationships may pull her away from motherhood. This represents one of the ways that
women experience a dynamic internal struggle in their decision to have a child in
contemporary Japan. Personal relations and the ideal gender model are not the only factors
in a woman’s struggle, but are two of the most significant factors in this category, and thus
were offered as examples of internal, individual factors that impact a woman’s decision
about childbearing.
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Because of the varied nature of experiences from person to person, there are a
number of considerations for a woman’s choice of whether or not to have a child that fall
into the category of internal, individual factors. Researchers have isolated and identified
these specific ways, such as the demand for women to fulfill the role of the yome, as the
singular cause for the low birth rate. Indeed, the burden of such a caregiving role may sway
a woman’s decision to not have a child, but it is not the only reason for declined preference.
Instead, the low birth rate is an outcome that occurs when the combination of all
categories—internal, individual; internal, public; external, economic; and external,
institutional factors—happens in society simultaneously. This thesis holds that the low
birth rate is the result of a systemic problem.
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III. INTERNAL, PUBLIC FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE A WOMAN’S DECISION
ABOUT CHILDBEARING
Both internal, individual factors and internal, public factors deal with matters that
are likely to be internalized by a person, from the emotional nature of deciding whether or
not to have a child. The difference between the two categories lies in how the internalized
component is manifest in society. Internal, individual factors refer to a person’s unique life
experiences, reflecting values that are brought about by their upbringing. These
characteristics and values are impressed upon a woman through circumstances that are
unique to her, such as from a parent or community member. Internal, public factors refer
to instances where the standards that are associated with the ideal gender model are
displayed and often upheld in public spaces, mass media, and popular culture. This chapter
will explore examples of how private concerns, such as the decision about childbearing,
are discussed publicly. One way that this occurs, for example, is through the stories of
television shows and movies.
Although I have assigned a different aspect to each chapter, there is not a greater
emphasis placed on any one particular section as the cause for the population decline. This
thesis demonstrates that there is no specific trait in society that is the source for the low
birth. It is the condition that is formed when these elements work together that inhibits
population growth. Moreover, the very existence of internal, public factors reveals the
societal mentality that the private decision of whether or not to have a child is within the
realm of public concern. This social phenomenon offers opportunities, however, to
examine the difference between the idealized and alternative gender roles, which highlights
the struggle that women go through in their decision about childbearing. Like internal,
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individual factors, the sponsorship of the idealized gender role of women in mass media
should motivate women to have children, yet the opposite holds true. This paradox will be
explored in the ensuing sections.
Challenges to the Ideal Female Gender Model in Mass Media
Yoshio Sugimoto, a renowned scholar and prolific writer on Japanese society,
claims that “mass culture in contemporary Japan is a lively and potent force the affects
numerous people through mass media,” which includes television and popular press. 77
Thus, the ideas and values represented in the various forms of mass culture pervade the
everyday lives of Japanese citizens. Midori Suzuki described the effect of television on
women’s thinking, stating:
Integrally related to this issue concerns the ways women are portrayed on
television, which tend to be highly stereotyped and biased. Most women,
however, are not aware of this, so that the influence of television on their
thinking and behavior, both consciously and unconsciously, is all the more
extensive. 78
Suzuki explained that women are often presented in mass media in the conservative
stereotype of mothers and wives. However, it can be argued that mass culture is a doubleedged sword. The same platform of mass media can be used to easily and effectively
promote the ideals of conservatives and feminists alike.
Take, for example, the genre of manga, Japanese comic books that are read by all
ages. One such manga titled Sazae-san ran in the Asahi newspaper from 1946 to 1974, and
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continues to air on Japanese television today as an anime, or cartoon. Sugimoto writes in
regards to Sazae-san:
The best-known postwar Japanese cartoonist, Machiko Hasegawa, was a
woman who penned the comic strips that centered on the everyday life of a
housewife named Sazae-san, and her family members. Serialized in the
morning edition of the Asahi newspaper for more than three decades, Sazaesan became a household name and popularized a housewife’s perspective
on Japanese society throughout the postwar period. 79
Although the general plot of Sazae-san appears to conform to the conventional agenda, in
that Sazae-san is a housewife and mother, Sazae-san herself personified the generation of
young women that lived during the immediate post-war era who found liberation in Japan’s
new constitution, which included equal rights and suffrage for women. 80 The fact that
Sazae-san was written by a woman about a woman and found such national success is a
representation in itself of the changing role of women in Japan at that time.
Although many of the comics were humorous representations of the mundane,
some strips highlighted key social issues and provided political commentary. Timothy
Craig, a scholar of Japanese popular culture, stated, “In one [comic], for example, Sazaesan attends a public discussion on equal rights, at which she declares that men too must
strive for women’s liberation.” 81 Thus, Hasegawa was able to utilize the mass media form
of manga to channel her progressive ideals, promote gender equality, and influence a large
population of women. In a broad sense, Sazae-san is one of the many representations of
feminist ideals broadcasted through mass media that may have swayed generations of
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women to take a less passive role in their own lives, and prompted women to engage in a
lifestyle apart from being a mother. Sazae-san served, and continues to serve in the anime
as a role model for women and their daughters to break the mold of the submissive
housewife, to claim their independence, and to pursue roles outside of motherhood. In other
words, Sazae-san is a proponent of alternative gender roles.
When feminists are not the focus of mass media and traditional gender values are
supported instead, feminist groups often utilize mass media to respond with criticism in
kind. For instance, Vera Mackie, a professor of Japanese gender and sexuality studies,
describes an instant noodle television commercial from 1975. “A woman makes up some
instant noodles for her male partner, stating ‘I am the one who cooks them’. The man
responds ‘I am the one who eats them’.” 82 The clear division of labor, that the woman
produces and the man consumes, caught the attention of the International Women’s Year
Group, who had formed earlier that same year. In response to the commercial, the group
lobbied against the extreme division of labor represented in the advertisement. Such
gendered division of labor continues to exist in Japan today and may factor into a woman’s
decision of whether or not to have a child.
As time goes on, however, movies and television series are shifting away from the
pattern of the ideal gender model and are adapting more to the contemporary reality. More
often, female characters are shown as single, in their thirties or older, and pursuing careers,
reflecting the increasing prevalence of this group in real life. For instance, Last Cinderella
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is a Japanese drama that aired in 2013. 83 The main character is a 39-year-old woman named
Sakura Toyama, who is involved in a love triangle with two men. Last Cinderella acts as
a forum to address existing views of gender ideals in Japanese society. The title itself
implies the Western notion of a woman who goes from rags to riches solely because of her
marriage but it is unclear if this was the intention of the show’s writers. Sakura receives
the pet name “Cinderella” from Hiroto, one of her love interests, because he found her shoe
in a hotel stairwell after she had drunkenly tossed it aside. The word “last” also has several
implications. For Sakura, society would say that this is her last chance to get married since
she is turning forty. In a larger context, though, it could also mean that Cinderellas are a
dying breed, thanks to alternative gender roles.
Sakura works at a beauty salon, but is a tomboy in fashion and behavior, with a
morning routine that includes shaving her face and eating at a stand-only ramen (noodle)
shop, where she is the only female customer. As she goes about town, she is shown
unconsciously mirroring the gestures of her male counterparts. When she is working at the
beauty salon, Sakura is depicted as highly dedicated to her career, knowledgeable in her
position as Assistant Manager, and a kind and considerate community member. When
chatting with a customer in the first episode, the client asks Sakura, “Are you not married
yet?” To which Sakura replies, “My job is my husband right now.” 84 Despite having
worked as Assistant Manager at the salon for eight years, it is revealed that Sakura has been
skipped over for a promotion opportunity three times, likely because of her age and despite
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her qualifications. It is understood that Sakura has chosen to put her romantic life on hold,
delaying marriage and therefore children, so that she can advance her career, a life course
in an alternative gender role that is becoming increasingly common.
The show utilizes the supporting characters to represent other situations that women
are more often finding themselves in. For example, Sakura’s friend, Miki Takenouchi,
upholds the idealized gender role of wife and mother but is suffering a sexless marriage. In
one episode, she plans for a romantic evening with her husband, when her overbearing
mother-in-law shows up unannounced. The mother-in-law immediately assumes the role
of the oppressive stereotype, micromanaging Miki to further place her in the idealized
gender role. Of course, the relationship between the two women is exaggerated, as the
mother-in-law literally pushes Miki out of the way, but the weight of the roles of daughterin-law, wife, and mother is apparent and relevant to the situation faced by many Japanese
women, nonetheless. For some unmarried women, the scenario may serve as a warning of
what may come and contributes to their struggle in deciding whether or not to have
children.
The show uses Sakura and Rintaro Tachibana, Sakura’s male boss and later love
interest, to exemplify the different views of male and female gender ideals. In one scene,
Sakura and Rintaro happen to end up at the same restaurant. When Sakura orders a beer,
Rintaro criticizes her, stating that she should be more modest because a woman should not
drink alcohol in the middle of the day. The following translated dialogue ensues:
Sakura: “So you’re saying that men can drink during the day but women
can’t?”
Rintaro: “If women act like men, there will be no distinction between the
sexes.”
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Sakura: “There’s nothing women aren’t allowed to do that men are.”
Rintaro: “That’s why you can never be successful. No matter how much
women have progressed, it’s still a male-dominant society. Women that
can’t kiss up to men won’t get far in their career or love life.” 85
Rintaro’s statement rings true for Sakura, who is still recovering from the realization that
her company refuses to promote her, but she remains defiant, stating, “If kissing up to guys
is the only way, I’d rather stay as I am now.” This dialogue verbalizes the problem that
many women face, as women who do not conform to the ideal gender model are negatively
impacted in other parts of their lives. This creates a dynamic situation where women are
often forced to choose between having a career and having a family. The effect of
employment on the lives of women and their childbearing decision will be covered in a
later chapter as part of the external, institutional factors; however, Last Cinderella is an
excellent example of how the elements discussed in this thesis can overlap. Last Cinderella
deals with both internal, public factors and external, institutional factors by representing
the perceptions of an unmarried, childless woman in a profession on a television show.
Equally important, Last Cinderella depicts a woman in what has become an alternative
gender role, but is still portrayed in a very positive light.
Similar topics have been presented in the forms of books and movies, as well. Fear
and Trembling, for instance, is a novel that later became a film. 86 The story focuses mostly
on the differences in cultures and business practices between Japan and the West, through
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the eyes of Amelié Nothomb, a Belgian woman working in a Japanese company. However,
the story does offer some insight into the lives of female workers of the time, through the
story of the main character’s manager. Fubuki is Amelié’s unmarried supervisor who is
deemed past the age of marriage at twenty-nine years old. Like Sakura from Last
Cinderella, Fubuki has devoted herself to her career instead of focusing on her personal
life, and has had to struggle for years to achieve a low level managerial position.
Nothomb’s perspective, although from an outsider, provides insight on the insistence for
women to marry. In the novel, she describes how she sees Fubuki, and the lives of all
Japanese women, stating, “if the Japanese woman is to be admired—and she is—it is
because she doesn’t commit suicide. Society conspires against her from her earliest
infancy…‘If you are not married by the time you are twenty-five, you’ll have good reason
to be ashamed.’” 87 Nothomb’s narrative was written in the late 1990s, but the same societal
pressure for Japanese women to marry and have children remains today. One way that this
norm has changed, however, is the age at which it is “too late” for a woman to be married.
In the 1990s, women were pressed to marry in their twenties. Today, as evidenced in mass
media by shows like Last Cinderella, society acknowledges and is more accepting of the
fact that women are not getting married and having children until their thirties. 88 Due to
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the synonymous nature of marriage and childbirth, though, there is a direct correlation
between delayed marriage and the low birth rate. 89
The Value of the Ideal Female Gender Model Upheld in Mass Media
Although increasing in prevalence, depictions of single, childless women are still
uncommon in Japan. 90 The idealized female gender role is the predominant role portrayed
by females in mass culture. 91 Take, for example, this photo in Figure 3.1 of an
advertisement in the appliances department of a major retail store in the Shinjuku
neighborhood of Tokyo that was taken in the summer of 2015:
Figure 3.1. “Happī Wedingu [Happy Wedding]” Advertisement in
Bicqlo's Appliances Department in Tokyo, 2015. Photo courtesy of the author.
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The mannequin is dressed in a Western-style wedding dress and is placed right next to a
washing machine and other household appliances with a sign that reads “Happī Wedingu
[Happy Wedding].” The other mannequins in the area were also female, dressed in various
outfits that the store sold. The store, however, did not sell wedding dresses. The choice of
gender and dress for the mannequin as well as the message in the advertisement expresses
a direct connection to and endorsement of women as homemakers. In other words, public
spaces can be used in the same vein as mass media as a way of supporting the idealized
gender role for women.
The main group that advocates for the ideal gender model is conservative
politicians. Many of these civil servants use their position in the political arena to publicly
accuse women as consciously and purposefully lowering the birth rate, unsympathetic or
unaware of the challenges that contribute to women’s struggle in deciding whether or not
to have a child. One scholar writes:
In the late 1990s and the early 2000s, Japanese media and public
commentary in general tended to emphasize the generation gap between
young, carefree, and indulgent women and their family-oriented,
responsible mothers. Criticism of the young generation for its irresponsible
lifestyle later became bon ton especially among conservative critics and
politicians worried about Japan’s demographic problem, which was clearly
linked to delayed marriage. 92
Today, many conservatives in Japan view the low birth rate as a crisis and judge women
as the driving force for the declining population by not assuming their “proper” roles as
“good wives and wise mothers.” The public criticism of women for the population decline
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highlights the internal struggle that women go through when they want to have children
but are unable to, which is made worse by public condemnation.
Many government officials have used their political platform to openly criticize
women for not fulfilling the idealized gender role. Take, for instance, the following
example discussed by Susan Holloway:
In 2003, former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, a member of a government
commission charged with finding solutions to the population crisis, publicly
attributed Japan’s falling birth rate to the fact that Japanese women were
too highly educated. He also expressed his opinion that the government
should not provide a retirement pension to women who had dodged their
civic duty to have children. 93
The message from former Prime Minister Mori is a near identical sentiment to the
government’s stance on what the role of women should be in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. The fact that today’s politicians echo a belief held during a time of
oppression for women in Japan, unfortunately, indicates the strength of this gendered value
of women, and implies the difficulty that Japan has had in moving towards greater gender
equality.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s administration has been known to betray his platform
for the advancement of women’s interests on numerous occasions. In 2007, Abe’s health
minister at the time, Hakuo Yanagisawa, made a public statement, describing women as
“birth-giving machines” and urging them to “do their best per head” to boost the nation’s
birth rate. 94 Yanagisawa’s response to the ensuing criticism was that his description had
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been “too uncivil,” and left his position later that year. 95 The coldness of such comments
demonstrates the detachment that conservative critics express towards women and their
concerns.
Civil servants who speak on behalf of women’s interests, especially female
politicians, are often singled out for denunciation and are subject to intense scrutiny, as if
they personified the whole female population. In 2014, Tokyo lawmaker Ayaka Shiomura
was addressing the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly about the capital’s child-rearing policy,
when several assemblymen from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party shouted jeers like
“Hurry and get married” and “Are you not able to have a baby?” 96 After significant public
outcry and demands from Shiomura for the identification of the hecklers, one of the
perpetrators confessed and was forced to resign from his position. A couple of months later,
another Liberal Democratic Party Assemblyman, Zenji Nojima, commented on the event,
stating that the trouble was not in the message of the taunts, but “the problem was that such
a remark was made to an individual speaker in a public setting.” 97 The ignorance of
Nojima’s statement is particularly surprising, since he made this statement after he had
been appointed as head of a league that promotes gender equality. Thus, many conservative
politicians endorse the ideal gender model, reducing the ability of women to sexual
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reproduction and remaining uninformed of the outlying causes that are disincentives for
women to become mothers.
News media coverage on Japan’s low birth rate is symptomatic of society’s
perspective of the ideal gender model. News coverage has been a major source of the labels
created for various subpopulations, such as DINK’s (Double Income No Kids), which
describes married, working but childless couples. The majority of the terms related to the
low birth rate, though, are designed to pass judgement on females, ignoring the challenges
that women face and treating women as if they were actively choosing to lower the birth
rate. 98
Lynne Nakano, a Yale researcher who studied single women in Tokyo, comments
on the media portrayal of single women, stating, “Single women are described in
remarkably negative terms in the Japanese mass media. One such term, for example,
‘parasite singles’ (parasaito shinguru) refers to adult single women who live with their
parents.” 99 The term parasaito shinguru became popularized in the 2000s, after sociologist
Yamada Masahiro published his book, Parasaito shinguru no jidai (The Age of the Parasite
Singles). 100 In addition to the status of singlehood, the term implies that young Japanese
women are “too free and overly selfish,” and are “held responsible for the worsening
economic crisis in Japan and appear as the symbol for the impasse at which contemporary
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Japanese society has found itself.” 101 The term also does not take into account the reasons
for this type of alternative role or the obstacles to achieving the ideal. Suzanne Hall Vogel
and Steven Kent Vogel, researchers of Japanese culture and political science, stated,
“While the expression parasite single has a negative meaning, many Japanese people have
no choice but to live with their parents well into adulthood for financial reasons.” 102
Chapter Five on external, economic factors will further explore the impact of finances on
a women’s decision about childbearing, but the use of this derogatory term demonstrates
the harsh social climate that women are subjected to when they do not conform to the
idealized gender role.
NEETs (Not involved in Education, Employment, or Training) is a newer term that
has taken the place of the term “parasite singles” in Japanese mass media and public
discourse. Like parasite singles, NEETs are considered “problematic young people,”
because they are not considered productive members of society. 103 Despite the fact that
housewives, too, do not typically pursue education, employment or training, they are
exempt from falling into this category because of the societal expectation that they will
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fulfill the duties of mothers and homemakers. 104 Thus, if women do not conform to the
idealized gender role by becoming mothers, they are given a derogatory label and are
subject to intensely negative social criticism, despite the systemic mechanisms in place that
prevent them from achieving professional development.
Some of the terms used to describe women are derived from television shows. Arafō
(Around 40), for example, is a television drama about a 39-year-old psychiatrist who,
despite feeling satisfied with a successful career, is “constantly reminded that ‘if you want
children, you should marry now’ and that ‘this is women’s happiness,’” referring to
motherhood. 105 The title, Arafō, has come to label the population of women who first
started the trend of alternative female gender roles by postponing marriage in order to
pursue their education and careers. Ofra Goldstein-Gidoni, a researcher of gender and
women in Japan, claims that “after working hard, thus delaying marriage, [the arafō
generation] were labeled loser dogs.” 106 The term “loser dogs” is yet another catchphrase
to identify the arafō population, and was first used by Sakai Junko in her book, Makeinu
no tōboe (The Howl of the Loser Dogs) in 2003. 107 Despite its misleading title, the feminist
novel focused on the freedom associated with being single.
Not all female portrayals in mass media revolve around criticism or illicit a feminist
response. The idealized female gender roles of housewife and mother are so firmly fixed
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in Japanese culture that milder representations are often overlooked and accepted as part
of daily life. Midori Suzuki pointed out that “married women characters, whether depicted
as employed outside the home or not, are shown in their ‘places’: in housekeeping roles—
cooking, shopping, laundering—and as the caretakers of husbands and children.” 108 This
canon holds true for the married characters in the television series discussed in this chapter.
In Last Cinderella, Sakura’s married friend, Miki, is often shown in the context of her roles
as wife and mother. 109 In Arafō, Satako’s married friend, Takeuchi Mizue, is usually shown
in her role as a full-time housewife. 110 Thus, the idealized gender role is present even in
media forms that seek to break away from the norm. Mass media that depicts alternative
while still acknowledging the pressure of the ideal gender model is symbolic of the struggle
that many women endure in their decision of whether or not to have a child.
Summary
Internal, public factors alone are not reason enough to cause the low birth rate, but
are proven more effective in lowering the birth rate when working simultaneously with the
other factors discussed in this thesis. Although individual and public factors both deal with
subjects that are internalized, internal, public factors refer to the manifestation of ingrained
influences in public spaces, mass media, and popular culture. Because of the easy access
to a wide audience, internal, public factors are able to support the ideal gender model on a
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national level and are a strong influence on women to conform to the idealized gender role,
which advocates for marriage and children.
Not all forms of mass media represent women as submissive housewives, however.
Created seventy years ago, Sazae-san is one of the most well-known and long-lasting
manga in Japan. As a housewife and mother, she was easily relatable to her readers. As a
feminist, she struck a chord with the generation of women that came into adulthood during
the postwar era, who were armed with a new constitution and sought to take a less passive
role in their lives. Sazae-san may have been one of the first postwar female representations
to inspire real women to pursue identities beyond motherhood.
Many television shows, books, and movies, like Last Cinderella, Arafō, and Fear
and Trembling, break away from the mold set by the idealized gender role by depicting
real situations faced by women in contemporary Japanese society. More often, female
characters are shown as single professionals in their thirties. These forms of entertainment
also illustrate the social consequences for their lifestyles, such as the stigma of being forty
and never married, as well as the personal loneliness of not having a family, something that
resonates with women as they consider whether or not to have a child of their own. In
addition to forming a relatable and genuine emotional connection to the audience, the
shows are likely successful because of the increasing prevalence of single, thirtysomethings.
Despite the fact that women are more often being represented in entertainment in
roles other than motherhood, women who do not fulfill the idealized gender role in real life
are still subject to social scrutiny. News coverage of Japan’s low birth rate is highly
suggestive of the stereotype for women to become mothers at an “appropriate” age. Women
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who remain unmarried and without children are labeled as “parasite singles,” and “loser
dogs.” Meanwhile, when the category is broadened to include men, the terms take on a
more neutral tone through the use of acronyms, such as “DINKs,” and “NEETs.” Thus,
women are pushed to seek the protection of motherhood to avoid the public reproach.
The existence of internal, public factors is an interesting social phenomenon,
because of the implication that private decisions like whether or not to have children are
within the realm of public discourse. Because of this, mass culture often stresses the ideal
of women as mothers, but is more often depicting them in alternative gender roles. With
the birth rate as low as it currently is, the reinforcement of this ideal no longer appears to
be effective. In fact, further partiality towards the idealized gender role seems to be
detrimental to stimulating population growth by creating a distance between the existing
lifestyles of women and the ideal that they are supposed to attain. The demands of
motherhood in public perception are becoming increasingly incompatible with current
realities.
Because women are often shown as upholding the idealized gender role in mass
culture, however, the pressure to conform to this ideal is well rooted in Japan’s social
mentality and begins from an early age. 111 Midori Suzuki said, “In this way, women are
from childhood bound to the traditional view of the sexual division of labor,” in which
women are designated to the home and men to the office. 112 This chapter has already
touched on some components related to external, institutional factors, such as the corporate
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culture represented in Fear and Trembling, which will be discussed more thoroughly in
Chapter Five; however, examples of societal aspects that are a combination of the four
factors presented in this thesis only work to strengthen the argument for a systemic cause
to the low birth rate.
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IV. EXTERNAL, ECONOMIC FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE A WOMAN’S
DECISION ABOUT CHILDBEARING
From this point, I will move on from the internal factors to external factors, which
deal with the effect of the government, corporate, and economic establishment on society.
This category is further separated into economic factors, referring to both private and
public economies, and institutional factors, meaning the corporate and governmental
impact on people’s lives. This chapter will focus on how external, economic factors
influence a woman’s childbearing choice and contributes to the internal-external binary
struggle that women experience while making this decision.
As mentioned in the Introduction, many researchers are concerned about the low
birth rate because of the implications caused by the lack of replenishment to the workforce
population in the near future. 113 With a third of the population projected to be over 65 years
old in 2050, there is an increased demand for government programs, like social security
and public health insurance, which are funded largely in part by the revenue generated by
the workforce. 114 In other words, there is an increased expenditure from the growing
elderly population, but less contribution from the shrinking workforce, which will generate
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significant public debt. 115 For this reason, there is a strong national motivation to increase
the birth rate in order to improve population growth and economic prospects.
Economic cost, however, is one of the leading reported causes for delayed marriage
and childbearing among Japanese individuals. 116 This personal economic drain grows
greater as couples have more children and the norm of couples having only one child is on
the rise. 117 One of the greatest expenses of raising children in Japan is allocated to
education. 118 Having gone through the process of the education system themselves, many
young adults are aware of the substantial cost of childrearing and choose to postpone
having children until they think they can afford it. 119
Because the cost of raising children is significant enough, many women postpone
marriage in order to delay having children, with the intention of saving money so that they
can afford that phase of their life in the near future. 120 Once the decision to delay marriage
and children has been made, however, the resolution to remain single is strengthened by
the experience of enhanced economic autonomy, resulting in a longer period of singlehood.
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In addition to the individual’s private economy, the state of the national economy
has also been shown to affect the national birth rate. The economic collapse of the late
1990s, for example, brought about a fear of the future. 121 This period of time in Japanese
history, known as the bursting of the economic “bubble,” brought further attention to
Japan’s low birth rate as well as the role of women in society. According to Cargill and
Sakamoto, “The public also faced new problems that were not visible or problematic during
the rapid economic growth and the “bubble” economy.” 122 These issues had previously
gone unnoticed, masked by the economic success that the country experienced during the
postwar period. The generation that grew up during the economic “bubble” and entered
adulthood when the “bubble” burst lived through a sudden decline in both private and state
economies, fostering a distrust in state financial institutions and spurring a fear of future
economic insecurity. Although this distrust affects men and women alike, this thesis
maintains a focus on the issues that impact women, since they are the ones that shoulder
the blame in public discourses for the low birth rate. For women, this fear urges them to
maintain their careers and postpone marriage, with the intended goal of saving money for
the costly endeavor of married life and raising children. 123 The subsequent financial gain,
however, results in many single women choosing to maintain their financial independence
longer, rather than pursuing marriage, where they would be expected to leave their jobs
and rely on their husband’s income.
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Personal Economy as a Hindrance to Improving the Birth Rate
The high financial cost of raising children directly affects the population decline.124
The cards begin to stack against the birth rate when a couple first begins to consider getting
married. The ideal gender model encourages women to leave the workforce upon marriage.
The loss of income contributes to the cost of married life. This is supported by a survey
from the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, which found that
one of the leading reasons for delayed or lack of interest in having children among singles
is credited to the economic cost of marriage and childrearing. The survey states:
The [Japanese National Fertility] survey asked the never-married people
who intend to get married what they saw as potential obstacles if they were
to get married within a year. ‘Money for marriage’ was the most often
selected answer for both men and women [43.5% for men, 41.5% for
women]. 125
There is a direct correlation to the cost of married life and the low birth rate, as economic
costs are causing couples to get married and have children later in life. The survey explains,
“Couples are meeting one another at older ages, the length of courtship has lengthened,
and the trend of later marriage has further strengthened.” 126 As couples spend their youth
saving up funds in order to have children or postponing the cost, there are less fertile years
available to them to have children. Additionally, there is a positive correlation between the
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age group of female participants and the selection of “hate to bear children in older age” as
an obstacle to having children (38%). 127 This signifies that financial stability achieved later
in life is not a motivator for childbirth for over a third of the population. It is necessary,
therefore, to curb the costs of marriage and childrearing in order to facilitate initiating that
stage of life at younger, more fertile years.
The discrepancy between the ideal number of children and the actual number of
children that a couple expects to have is suggestive of further economic impediments to
the birth rate. The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research conducted
another survey that specifically questioned married participants on their ideal number of
children (2.42 children) and the number of children that they realistically intend to have
(2.07 children). 128 In addressing the high ideal number but low achievement, the survey
stated that “although childbearing intentions continue to be present among young couples,
those intentions are not realized,” largely credited to the economic cost. 129 The survey
reported that 65.9% of female survey participants chose the option “it costs too much to
raise and educate children” as a hindrance to having children. 130
In 2001, a report from AIU Insurance found that “the cost of raising a child in
Tokyo from birth to college graduation now [in 2001] ranges from 28.59 million yen [about
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$250,000 in 2001] to 63.01 million yen [about $550,000 in 2001].” 131 If a child was sent
to public school throughout their life, the cost was the less expensive of the two options,
indicating that education was the greatest determining reason in elevated cost.
In 2011, the Cabinet Office released a similar report with updated information, but
the economic concerns remained. The report stated that “the total expenditure on the first
child accumulated from birth through age 18 is approximately 16.5 million yen [about
$180,000 in 2008] based on 2004-2008 data.” 132 There is a significant decrease in the
reported cost of raising children between the two accounts, but this is in part because of
the difference in ages included. The first report accounted for the cost of four-year
universities, while the second does not. In comparison, the United States Department of
Agriculture found that the average cost of raising a child to the age of eighteen in the United
States was about $245,000 as of 2013. 133 In 2011, the Korea Institute of Health and Social
Affairs found the cost of raising a child to high school graduation to be around 194 million
won (about $172,000). 134 Figure 4.1 below illustrates the comparison of costs between
these three countries, and demonstrates the similarity in cost between South Korea and
Japan. While the cost of raising children in Japan appear to be lower than the United States,

131

“Raising Child Cost 63 Million Yen: Study,” Japan Times, May 15, 2001, accessed
December 23, 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2001/05/15/national/raising-childcosts-63-million-yen-study/#.Vnw_z1IrdxV.
132

Hori, “The Expenditure on Children in Japan,” 1.

133

United States Department of Agriculture, Expenditures on Children by Families, Center
for Nutrition Policy and Promotion, 2014.
134

The Chosunilbo, “How Much Does it Cost to Raise a Child in Korea?,” January 4, 2011,
accessed April 9, 2016, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/01/04/20
11010400949.html.

54

this number does not include the income lost when a mother stops working to take care of
her child.
Figure 4.1. International Comparison of the Cost of Raising Children (in U.S. Dollars) 135
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The Cabinet Office report found that the greatest expenses were accrued from
medical costs and education. The medical expense for a child under one-year-old was about
120,000 yen ($1,300 in 2008), which did not include the delivery, an estimated cost of least
500,000 yen ($5,500 in 2008). 136 As for education, the report states:
Annual household expenditure on education, which is assumed to be
assignable only to children, appears to have two peaks, one around
preschool years and one around high school years. The latter peak, around
high school years (for the first child), exceeds 500,000 yen [$5,500 in 2008],
and is the largest item in child rearing expenditure. 137
These are direct expenses and do not include the cost of lost income incurred when a mother
stops working in order to care for her child.
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The Cabinet Office also found that the “average per child expenditure (accumulated
over the same period) in a household with two children is reduced to about 11 million yen
[about $122,000 per child in 2008].” The study attributes the decrease in average cost per
child to less available funds and parents who economize their budget with the second child.
Despite the reduction in the amount spent per child, the overall cost increased by 5.5
million yen (about $64,000 as of 2015), demonstrating that economic hardship increases
as couples have more children. This fact is also reflected in the National Institute of
Population and Social Security Research survey, which found that personal economy
became an increasingly greater obstacle as couples had more children, typically limiting
the couples to having one or two children. 138
Because the cost of raising children is significant enough, many women postpone
getting married in order to delay having children. The decision to put off marriage and
children is further strengthened by one of two resulting consequences, either a woman
continues working and finds that she does not have time and money available for meeting
a suitable partner, or a woman finds enjoyment in her financial autonomy. According to
the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, “the proportions of
respondents who ‘pay special attention to clothing and personal belongings’ and ‘travel for
purposes other than business’ are high among women (62.9% and 33.9%, respectively).”139
Single working women are free to accept promotions and office transfers, and enjoy a more
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self-directed lifestyle by going on vacations, or splurging on expensive meals. The
idealized female gender role, however, urges women to prioritize their role as mothers and
provide quality, hands on childcare. As a married woman, family funds would be spent less
on leisure and more on necessities. Single women are aware of the change in mentality that
would be required of them and find the financial independence of singlehood to be a more
economically stable option, encouraging them to stay single longer.
In the idealized gender role, women must quit their jobs and rely on their husbands’
income, a deficit that contributes to the high cost of having children. Suzanne Hall Vogel
and Steven Kent Vogel said, “Japanese society, especially before 1945, taught that a
woman should always be financially dependent upon and obedient to a man—first her
father, then her husband, and finally her son.” 140 Today, however, more women are able to
make a living on their own and without relying on a husband or child. In fact, financial
autonomy combined with the fact that, as Fumie Kumagai said, “often the conditions of
married life in Japan are not very attractive for able and independent women,” which works
to prevent marriage and therefore childbearing. 141 The financial autonomy available to
unmarried, childless, working women is shown to be a strong motivator to maintain that
status, since singlehood offers more financial and personal independence.
National Economy as a Reason to Improve the Birth Rate
While the individual level of economic factors has a number of drawbacks to having
children, the national level only sees the benefit to population growth. Significant research
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has been conducted in the past decades that indicates a correlation between demography
and economics, specifically the economic impact of an aging population. The “bubble”
economy and its subsequent “burst” play an important role in Japan’s low birth rate. From
the postwar period to the 1990s, Japan experienced significant economic growth. Thomas
Cargill, an economist who studies Japanese financial policies, and Takayuki Sakamoto, a
political science researcher, describe this era, stating:
In term of most economic and financial indicators, Japan’s performance
outpaced many other industrial countries, especially Japan’s ability to
achieve stable noninflationary growth in the face of a second set of oil price
shocks in 1979 while at the same time adopting a policy of domestic and
international financial liberalization. 142
Japan gained world recognition for its economic prosperity during the “bubble,” which
reached its height in the early 1980s. They go on to say, “The period from 1980 to 1985
represents the high-water mark of the Japanese economy in terms of financial and central
bank policy outcomes.” 143 The “bubble bursting” began in the early 1990s, when “asset
prices collapsed, and subsequent events revealed a fundamentally weak financial system
and set the stage for a long period of intense economic distress.” 144
The generation that experienced the sudden economic collapse of the 1990s
developed a distrust in state financial institutions, from which grew a fear of future
economic insecurity. Cargill and Sakamoto commented on the sentiments of the “bubble”
economy generation, claiming that “the aging of the population and the growing costs of
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health care and social security generated increasing uncertainty about the future.” 145 This
fear that the future may not be financially secure continues to survive today. Many couples
are hesitant to have children because they worry they may not be able to afford the expenses
in the future. Consequently, this fear urges women to maintain their careers and, if they
desire to marry someday, spend years saving for married life and motherhood. The birth
rate has been in steady decline since the postwar period, with no significant change to
determine that a prosperous economy equates to a high birth rate. However, fears of
economic hardship have been proven to perpetuate the low birth rate and economic stability
could also bring it to a level of population replenishment.
Stabilizing the birth rate is necessary, especially in light of the wide range of
predictions for Japan’s population decline. Japan’s populace stood at 127.1 million in
2014. 146 Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare predicts that, without adequate
intervention, the population will fall to 86.7 million by 2060, a decrease of about 32% of
its current population. 147 As mentioned previously, a third of the population is projected to
be of retirement age in 2050. 148 Additionally, a decline in the total population results in a
reduction in the workforce population. Cargill and Sakamoto considered the effect of the
aging population on Japan’s economy by discussing the ratio of the population over the
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age of sixty-five to the workforce population, defined as ages twenty to sixty-four. They
found that “in 2055 Japan, approximately 1.4 current workers will support one aged citizen,
whereas, in 2000, 3.6 current workers supported one aged citizen.” 149 In the past, nearly
four working individuals supported one non-working person. In contrast, future workers
will need to support a retiree singlehandedly. This implies that the population in the
workforce will be nearly equal to the population that is not working.
Such a weight on the declining workforce would burden economic growth and
induce a rise in public debt. Some scholars found that “Japan’s rapidly aging population
will result in a steady increase in national medical expenditure under the current public
health insurance.” 150 Robert Dekle, whose research focused on international finance and
economics in Japan and East Asia, discussed Japan’s aging population and the negative
effect it could have on its’ waning economy, stating, “If the situation does not improve, the
resulting huge public debt is expected to sharply increase Japanese interest rates, lower
Japan’s international creditworthiness, and adversely affect the welfare of future
generations.” 151 With Japan’s role as a global economic leader, a weakened Japanese
economy would affect worldwide finances, as was evident in the late 1990s when Japan’s
“bubble” economy burst.
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Summary
Economic influences are one of the two external factors that affect a woman’s
decision of whether or not to have children, with institutional factors comprising the other
half. Economic factors contribute both to the lack of and need for having children. The lack
of personal financial resources pulls women away from choosing motherhood while
national concerns over the threat of population and economic decline push for women to
have more children. The individual cost of raising and educating children in Japan is
significant, so many women postpone marriage to save the funds they will need for their
potential children. The trend of deferring marriage to work towards economic achievement
is embraced as a means to an end, even among those who seek to fulfill the idealized female
gender role by becoming wives and mothers. Economic cost is one of the leading reported
causes for delayed marriage and childbirth among Japanese individuals, with the economic
hurdle growing greater after each child. 152
Once the decision to delay having children has been made, however, these women
find themselves fulfilling an alternative gender role, which is further strengthened by the
economic autonomy proffered by singlehood. In some cases, these women remain
unmarried later in life because their dedication to achieving financial means has brought
them past the age deemed appropriate for marriage. As mentioned in the previous chapter,
these women are given derogatory labels without consideration for the economic causes of
their situation.
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The generation of women that are in their forties and fifties today have lived
through the various labels—“parasite singles” and “loser dogs”—at the height of their
usages and entered adulthood during the economic decline referred to as the bursting of the
economic “bubble.” Some scholars attribute the collapse of the economy in the 1990s to
Japan’s fixation on past methods. This is supported by Cargill and Sakamoto, who said,
“Japan’s ‘bubble’ economy in the second half of the 1980s and the almost fifteen years of
economic distress in the 1990s and first few years of the new century can be traced to
Japan’s unwillingness to depart from key elements of the old regime.” 153 Japan also has
demonstrated a resistance to change on the social and economic issues that came to light
with the “bubble” bursting, such as the financial hardships that deter women from having
children and direct women towards a more self-sustainable lifestyle as a single.
The economic crisis of the 1990s also brought with it a fear of future economic
insecurity that persists in Japanese society today. 154 This financial anxiety compounds the
problem of the high cost of marriage and childrearing and adds to the systemic issue of the
low birth rate. In order to prepare for married life, many women pursue careers initially in
hopes of saving funds for marriage and lessening the financial blow of supporting a family
on a single income. The economic autonomy of singlehood, however, results in many
single women choosing to maintain their financial independence longer, either out of
necessity or preference.
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Women who remain in the workforce are looked down upon by many conservatives
for not following the ideal gender model, believing that their actions are the cause of the
low birth rate. Yet, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has found that the advancement of women
in the workforce would not only bring more revenue to the state fund, but would potentially
boost the birth rate. 155 Therefore, women who remain in the workforce longer serve to
generate the additional revenue that is needed to fund government programs, such as elder
care, social security, and public health insurance, and in the long term could boost
population growth. 156 As more of the population reaches the age of retirement and fewer
children are born, the age gap widens, placing a greater weight on the workforce to provide
for social programs. It is necessary to address the large government medical expenditure
by increasing the workforce population through greater participation of women in order to
generate revenue and thereby prevent a potentially high national debt that would grow in
the coming decades. 157 For this reason, there is a strong national motivation to increase the
birth rate in order to improve population growth and economic prospects.
Key implications of corporate and governmental influences on the lives of women
will be examined further in the next chapter on external, institutional factors. The
discussion will specifically focus on public policies aimed at alleviating some of the
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economic strain placed on parents in order to nurture more births, demonstrating how the
various features defined in this thesis can interrelate. Intersection between the categories is
to be anticipated because of the systemic conditions that cause the low birth rate. A
woman’s decision of whether or not to have a child in Japan is formed from a number of
different influences from society. Because many of these influences are related to each
other, there is bound to be some overlap between the categories.
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V. EXTERNAL, INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE A WOMAN’S
DECISION ABOUT CHILDBEARING
This thesis defines external, institutional factors as the effect of the national,
prefectural, and local governments through public policies, and businesses through
corporate environment on a woman’s decision of whether or not to have children. With the
predictions of population decline and economic strain in the near future, the government
has worked to improve the lives of women by addressing some of the concerns they have
about becoming mothers. These public policies are designed to encourage women to have
more children, thereby boosting the national birth rate. Corporate culture has yet to join the
governmental effort, though, and remains firmly fixed on the male breadwinner model,
making it difficult for women to balance work and family, which contributes to a woman’s
struggle in her childbearing decision. 158
Japan’s aging population places significant economic stress on society, specifically
on the workforce, as examined in Chapter Four. Many researchers have found that this
burden can be alleviated through greater promotion of women in the labor force. As
considered in an earlier chapter, the responsibilities of women in marriage, specifically in
childbearing and rearing, prevent women from pursuing a career, forcing them to choose
between marriage and family, on the one hand, or a career, on the other hand. This chapter
will argue that Japan’s rigid corporate structure is responsible for preventing shared
responsibility of childcare by both parents, contributes to gender inequality, and creates a
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barrier to boosting the birth rate. 159 Corporate environment upholds the ideal gender model,
as evident by the overall lack of female participation in the workforce, and the lack of
female representation in managerial positions. 160 Many women are reluctant to marry and
have children because they would be expected to leave their career, which they likely
overcame many hardships to achieve. Although this corporate environment upholds the
ideal gender model and advocates that women have children, this gendered division of
labor has forced many women to decide between their careers or having children.
In an article published in The Wall Street Journal, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
wrote, “In 1999, Kathy Matsui and her colleagues at Goldman Sachs first advocated that
Japan could increase its gross domestic product by as much as 15% simply by tapping
further its most underutilized resource—Japanese women.” 161 The Japanese government
responded to such findings by instituting a number of public policies aimed at aiding
working mothers with “expanded daycare and nursing care services, implementation of
flexible work arrangements, and more objective evaluation and compensation systems.”162
Lack of childcare facilities available in communities and gender discrimination that is
prevalent in the corporate environment reinforce the ideal gender model, in that women are
directed away from the workforce and from using community care facilities and are led
towards the home, caring for their own children. Recent public efforts, however, have
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worked to address the needs of mothers so that they are better able to remain in the
workforce, but there has been an increasing trend of women postponing marriage in order
to pursue a career.
In keeping with the pattern established by the previous chapters, challenges to
boosting the birth rate will be presented first. In this case, the effect of corporate
environment and the ways that this prevents women from having a family will be explored.
This will then be followed by a discussion of the ways in which Japan is attempting to
boost fertility, namely through public policies.
The Influence of Corporate Culture as a Barrier to Having Children
According to the World Economic Forum’s 2015 Global Gender Gap Report, Japan
ranked 101st overall out of 145 countries, representing Japan’s poor performance of gender
equality by international standards. 163 In comparison, the United States ranked 28th and
South Korea ranked 115th as illustrated in Figure 5.1 below. 164 The report focused on four
areas to determine a nation’s level of gender equality: economic participation, education
attainment, health, and political involvement. Japan ranked equally men and women
equally in health and general education, but performed poorly in economic participation
and politics. The overall female participation rate in the labor force was reportedly 65%,
compared to 85% for males, meaning that women have a more difficult time finding and
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maintaining a job than men. 165 It also means that women face significantly more obstacles
than men in receiving a promotion. In addition, only 9% of working women participate in
the economy as legislators, senior officials, and managers, compared to the 91% male
participation, earning Japan the 116th rank in that category. This suggests the widespread
nature of gender discrimination in the workforce that exists in Japan and sheds more light
on the struggle that women experience in deciding whether or not to have a child.
Figure 5.1. International Comparison of Rankings
from the 2015 Global Gender Gap Report 166
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Patricia Boling narrowed the idea of gender discrimination in Japan’s workforce
down to the very definition of the “ideal worker” in Japan. She claimed:
Japanese workers strongly identify with their companies, and Japanese
companies expect their workers to devote themselves to the company and
the job without question, including working overtime, accepting transfers
(even when it means living away from their families sometimes even for
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months or years at a time), going out drinking several times a week, playing
on a company team, going on company outings, and the like. 167
The time-consuming and work intensive nature of the ideal worker leaves little time for a
family, whether the worker is male or female. Due to the expectation of women to become
mothers, the ideal employee, therefore, implies that the worker is male, which is supported
by the higher percentage of male participation and promotion in the workforce. Boling
found that the contemporary Japanese corporate environment “reinforces unjust and onesided arrangements in which women do virtually all the childrearing and housework and
take less interesting, less well-rewarded positions in the workforce because those are the
only ones compatible with their childcare responsibilities.” 168
In 2010, a survey conducted by the National Institute of Population and Social
Security Research reported that the majority of wives did not support the statement
“husbands should work and wives should stay home.” 169 This shows a desire from women
for greater gender equality in the home and workplace. Many women do have professional
aspirations and strive to be considered valuable employees, but since their employers hold
them to the ideal gender model as mothers, they face difficulties in advancing their careers.
When making the decision of whether or not to have a child, women must consider the
effect that motherhood will have on their careers and other parts of their lives. The rigid
corporate structure inhibits gender equality and contributes to the declining birth rate.
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The lower overall workforce participation rate by women can be directly linked to
the ideal gender model. Many researchers, like anthropologist Lynne Nakano, have noted
that the impact of employment on a person’s decision about childbearing is very different
for men and women. In her research, Nakano states, “For men, both marriage and
singlehood require continuous commitment to work. For women, in contrast, marriage
generally involves a commitment to caring for children and husband while singlehood
brings continuous full-time employment.” 170 Unlike men, women are conversely less
represented in the workforce overall, with a noticeable decline in participation in their
twenties and thirties, usually referred to as the M-curve. 171 Scholars have attributed this
dip in participation to the cultural norm of women leaving the workforce when they marry
in order to become housewives and mothers.
Sawa Kurotani commented on the support of the idealized gender role in corporate
environment:
Despite the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL), introduced in
1986, which officially opened the doors to career-track positions for women
in the corporate world, the society continues to pressure married women to
quit their jobs when they have children. 172
During the postwar period, Japan developed a two-track employment system that consisted
of a managerial or career track and an office staff track. The managerial track included
chances for promotions, benefits and other opportunities. The office staff track consisted
170
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of part-time, temporary and contract workers. The office staff track was typically pursued
by women, due to the flexibility those positions offered, which was more compatible with
the demands of motherhood. Louis Hayes, a political science scholar who conducted
research in various countries in Asia, including Japan, described the limited prospects that
these positions offered, stating, “Their temporary or part-time status means that women do
not receive fringe benefits, training opportunities, family and housing allowances, and
other income supplements accorded to permanent workers.”
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This is designed to

encourage women’s reliance on their husband’s income.
Although the two-track employment system was officially disbanded when the
Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) was first drafted, remnants of the old ways
remain. Before the EEOL, gender discrimination was an established, systematic part of the
corporate process. Today, peer pressure to conform to the idealized gender roles for men
and women is utilized, instead. Through the sponsorship of the idealized gender roles in
corporate environment, an individual’s position in a company will be largely determined
based on gender. Today, companies continue to assume that women will marry and leave
the workforce so they typically hire women in part-time or temporary contracts, positions
that offer little incentive to remain. One scholar remarks:
When women’s expectations are not fulfilled by the corporation, they may
opt to quit. Young women start a career as sōgōshoku [managerial track]
with high expectations, and when the company views them as unfit for the
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corporate world and places them in a mezzanine position or clerical
position, women feel discriminated against. 174
The lack of professional prospects in this capacity are added incentive for women to leave
the workforce and become housewives. Thus, unmarried women must choose to commit
to the managerial track and postpone marriage and family, or to give up their careers in
order to have a family.
The two-track system is revealing of gender discrimination against men, as well.
Because of the idealized gender role, it is more socially acceptable for women to limit the
amount of time that they work in an office, since they are assumed to prioritize their role
as caregivers first. 175 Men, however, are compelled to conform to their idealized gender
role by pursuing the managerial track, dedicating their time to the company rather than to
their families. 176 This prevents more equal parting of household responsibilities and the
lack of availability from her partner may factor into a woman’s decision of whether or not
to have a child.
The disparity in wages earned between the genders is also indicative of gender
inequality in the Japanese corporate structure. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe acknowledged
that “Japanese women earn, on average, 30.2% less than men (compared with 20.1% in the
U.S. and just 0.2% in the Philippines) [in 2013].” 177 The discrepancy in wages could be
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explained by corporate reinforced gender expectations. The salary earned by men is
assumed to be the sole income for his family, while the salary earned by women is
considered supplementary income, if she is married, or only for her, if she is single. Lower
wages for women may be designed to gear women towards marriage but this is, in fact,
contributing to the prevalence of delayed marriage. Many couples simply cannot afford to
get married and raise a child. Thus, corporate environment places women in an either-or
situation, forcing them to choose between pursuing a career or having a family, and women
are increasingly choosing to overcome the obstacles in the workplace to pursue a career. 178
The two-track system is not the only corporate practice that interferes with
women’s participation in the workforce. Louis Hayes commented on the outright gender
discrimination that is prevalent during the promotion process in many Japanese companies,
stating, “Less than 30 percent of Japanese companies will even consider hiring a woman
for a managerial or technical position. In the remaining 70 percent of companies, most jobs
open to women are as assembly-line workers, secretaries, and clerks.” 179 Even women who
are committed to their career are not given the full extent of opportunities available to their
male counterparts.
This fact is also stated by Thomas Cargill and Takayuki Sakamoto:
The common belief was that women who wanted to become or remain core
permanent workers more or less had to give up on having family and
children. Japanese companies operated on the assumption that female
workers quit work when they got married. In such a male-dominated
corporate environment, even women who gave up marriage and family had
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difficulty staying in their companies and be considered indispensable
workers. 180
The apparent intention of this corporate environment is to reinforce the idealized female
gender role of “good wives and wise mothers.” More often, however, women are choosing
to remain in the workforce longer, delaying marriage and motherhood instead. Again, there
is a dichotomy between the intent and reality that contributes to a woman’s struggle in
deciding whether or not to have a child. It is an interesting fact that as companies attempt
to reinforce the ideal gender model, which should boost the birth rate in theory, they are in
fact alienating the ideal by making it harder to achieve. This is supported by the fact that
the percentage of singles is on the rise, indicating that women are having a harder time
finding partners and are dedicating themselves more to their companies for their
livelihood. 181 The expectation of women to conform to the idealized gender role, thereby
excluding them from the workforce, is an indication that the contemporary Japanese
corporate environment is based on an outdated structural model and negatively affects the
low birth rate. Government and social intervention is needed to break the cycle, which can
be accomplished via public policies and a change in social mentality.
Government Policies Aimed at Promoting Childbirth
In 2013, as part of his economic reform, Prime Minister Abe responded to the
research that correlated the advancement of women in the workplace with an improvement
in both the economy and birth rate by instituting a number of governmental changes. Only
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recently have pro-fertility policies looked at gender equality in the workplace, however. 182
Nonetheless, the policies address issues in other areas of society and have since been
revised to increase the number of nurseries available, provide greater financial support to
parents, and improve government-sponsored eldercare programs.
Due to the lack of nurseries available in urban settings, there is a long waitlist for
families who are trying to enroll their children. An article from Bloomberg Business
reported, “There were 23,167 children on waiting lists [as of April 1, 2015], up almost 8
percent from the previous year.” 183 The result of this waitlist is that mothers often must
make the decision to leave their jobs and stay home to take care of their child until they are
accepted to a nursery, though this process can take years due to the long waitlist. Leonard
Schoppa, a researcher on Japan’s political system, stated, “The limited supply of childcare
and eldercare services, and the complete absence of family leave, pushed many women to
quit their jobs when they had children or when a family member needed care.” 184
Some parents also choose to not have more than one child because of the difficulties
they faced trying to enroll in a nursery with their first child. The government has sought to
rectify this issue through social reform with the increased production of child care facilities,
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particularly in urban areas where the demand is higher, and with the removal of nursery
fees for multiple children from the same family. The same article from Bloomberg Business
claimed that “there were 2.47 million daycare places available for pre-school-age children
[as of April 1, 2015], up by about 140,000 from the previous year.” 185 The government has
attempted to address the public concern for limited daycare facilities, but has been unable
to accommodate the demand. Thus, availability of nurseries may factor into a woman’s
decision of whether or not to have a child.
Another government policy is the jidō teate, or Child Allowance System. 186 In
2012, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare released a report with a number of
updated public policies that would be put in place until the 2016 fiscal year, which included
revisions to the Child Allowance System. This act falls in the category of “family cash
benefits,” which “includes child allowances for families with young children, designed to
help them offset the added costs and lost wages associated with child rearing, and
additional means-tested payments to poor families with children.” 187 As shown in the
previous chapter, the economic cost for raising children is a strong deterrent to having
children. Thus, it is important to note the government’s efforts to combat economic
challenges. In the Child Allowance program, families with children younger than three
years old receive ¥15,000 each month (about $122 in 2015). After a child turns three years
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old, families receive ¥10,000 (about $81 in 2015) until the child graduates from junior high
school. 188 Unfortunately, as Schoppa points out, “though this program began with great
fanfare in 1973, by the 1990s the value of this source of support had eroded to the point
where it had little impact on the average family’s finances.” 189 Although the Child
Allowance System provides some monetary relief for parents, it is not enough to impact
the significant cost of childrearing in Japan and continues to be a concern for women in
their decision of whether or not to have a child.
Another public policy focuses on relieving the burden of eldercare placed on
women. As stated in the chapter on internal, individual factors, idealized gender roles and
familial expectations mandate that women take care of their husband’s parents. Familial
responsibilities have shifted so that women are often the desired care provider for their own
parents, as well. Depending on the family, a woman may be held accountable in caring for
both sets of parents. 190 Some women are overburdened with the obligation of caring for
their aging parents or in-laws that they cannot have children due to the time and financial
demands of caring for their elderly relatives. 191 Taking this matter into consideration, the
government has implemented a policy that builds more eldercare facilities. It is becoming
more socially acceptable to utilize these facilities, especially when a parent is quite elderly
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or suffers from a disease, such as Alzheimer’s. 192 Even so, the issue of time and energy
constraints on a woman who is already caring for elderly relatives may factor into her
childbearing decision.
Despite their aim at improving the birth rate, previous public policies have had little
effect on population growth. Often, these policies were modelled after policies that were
developed and proven effective in other nations. Recent research shows, though, that these
policies have not been successful in Japan, implying an alternative cause for the low birth
rate rather than poor policy-making. 193 While the improvement of childcare and eldercare
services acknowledges and alleviates the caregiving burden placed on women, society has
turned to government-funded programs, rather than looking to male relatives to care for
their families. The policies may be ineffective because they seek to reinforce the ideal
gender model, and do not address gender inequality in the corporate structure. Additionally,
the financial benefits are likely not significant enough motivate women who are of lower
socioeconomic status to have a child. Therefore, these policies may only improve
conditions for women who are already likely to have children (i.e. married and in good
socioeconomic standing).
Summary
This chapter has focused on external, institutional factors, specifically the ways in
which public policies and corporate environment impact a woman’s decision of whether or
not to have a child. These two external examples also perpetuate the ideal female gender
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model of women as mothers. Though, this effort to reinforce the idealized gender role also
highlights a number of impediments that women face when trying to achieve a balance
between their professional and personal lives, such as the obstacles that women face as
employees. Due to the systemic nature of Japan’s low birth rate, there are a number of ways
in which the four categories are interconnected, like public policies that aim to alleviate the
economic burden of childrearing.
Japan ranks in the bottom third of global gender equality reports, signifying
systemic gender inequality, especially in politics and business. 194 Corporate environment
idealizes men as employees and women as mothers, evident by the wage discrepancy
between men and women, the lack of female representation at higher management
positions, and the overall lesser percentage of female participation in the workforce.195
Scholars have commented on this systemic gender inequality, stating, “Japanese society
will be forced to become a friendlier place for women, because of the declining population
and the need to increase fertility rates, population, and the workforce.” 196 Current corporate
environment places women in an either-or situation in which they are denied a balance
between full-time employment and having a family, significantly impacting their decision
of whether or not to have children. The contemporary Japanese corporate environment
supports the expectation of women to conform to the ideal gender model, thereby excluding
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them from the workforce. This suggests that the current corporate environment is based on
an outdated structural model and negatively affects the low birth rate.
The Japanese government has responded to public concern for the low birth rate
and has intervened through the development of a number of pro-fertility public policies.
The development of more childcare and eldercare facilities, increased capacity for existing
facilities, and greater economic support for parents have been utilized to encourage couples
to have more children. While these policies seek to alleviate the encumbrance of care on
women, they fortify the idealized gender role for women by excluding men from such
caregiving roles. The government has also been unable to adequately deal with gender
inequality in the corporate environment, as well, as stated by Susan Holloway:
The government has had less success, however, in compelling employers to
eliminate sexist employment practices that prevent women from staying in
the labor force after having a child; nor has there been much progress in
creating a culture of work that doesn’t preclude the worker’s participation
in family life. 197
The majority of pro-fertility public policies target working mothers and do not
focus on single women or men. However, in early 2015, a revision to the child promotion
policy included goals for: (a) improved matchmaking services for singles, such as those
advertised in Figure 5.2 below, (b) male involvement in childcare by measuring paternity
leave and average time spent with families, and (c) additional improvements to nurseries
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by allowing families with three or more children to have priority access to nurseries and
day cares. 198
Figure 5.2. “Kekkon dekinai hito wo zero ni [The people who cannot get married to
zero]” Matchmaking Advertisement in Tokyo, 2015. Photo courtesy of the author.

Perhaps the most recent revision will yield greater results at improving population
growth, considering it makes a stronger effort than previous attempts to foster marriage
and father involvement in childrearing. Along with the improved policies, a government
campaign showing men as fathers and caregivers in a positive way could help to change
gender views such that a caregiving father would be socially acceptable and desirable,
especially among companies. This shift from the ideal gender model is the key to
improving gender equality and the birth rate.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Aiko’s Story
Susan Holloway, the Child Development and Education scholar who researched
Japanese mothers, created an imaginary situation to “envision how conditions in
contemporary Japanese society affect young women contemplating marriage and family
life,” which she describes as thus:
An imaginary young college student named Aiko falls into casual
conversation with Chihiro, the frustrated mother in our study. When Aiko
mentions that she is studying consumer sciences at a nearby university,
Chihiro begins to describe her former exciting career as a professional in
the field of industrial design. She goes on to chronicle her subsequent
departure from the workplace when it became apparent how difficult it
would be to manage the job and perform all her household duties with little
help from her husband. She describes her persistent sense of failure as a
mother, her feeling of estrangement from her husband, and her boredom at
her part-time job. 199
By the end of the conversation, Aiko has decided to “postpone the inevitable choice
[between marriage and career] by waiting as long as possible to give in to her boyfriend’s
desire to get married.” 200
The narrative fairly accurately describes the interconnection and impact of the
various factors discussed in this thesis. Although Holloway does not mention the fact that
the ideal gender model is reiterated to Aiko through internal, public factors like mass media,
the other factors are present in this short story. Internal, individual factors are present in
that Aiko now has a personal relationship with the frustrated mother Chihiro, who is
unconsciously encouraging Aiko to forgo the ideal gender model. External, economic
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factors are implied in that Chihiro has taken on a part-time job presumably for the
additional income, since it is not for her enjoyment. And finally, external, institutional
factors are present in the struggle that Chihiro experienced in trying to balance work and
family. This story drawn up by Holloway is a great example of the many influences on a
woman’s decision of whether or not to have a child and the systemic nature of Japan’s low
birth rate.
This thesis has utilized the platform of the low birth rate to discuss the gap between
the ideal gender model of women as mothers and alternative gender roles, which is a strong
cause for the internal-external struggle that women experience as they decide whether or
not to have children. Although specific examples were provided in each chapter, there is
not any single element responsible for the low birth rate. As seen in Aiko’s story, it is the
culmination of Chihiro’s conversation that influences Aiko’s decision to delay marriage,
rather than a single detail. Furthermore, I explored some of the ways that increased
reinforcement of the ideals does not improve the birth rate, but in fact further alienates
women from becoming mothers. Public discourse acknowledges the issue as a national
concern in terms of its widespread nature, but points the finger at women as the cause.
Through the examination of a number of different aspects of Japanese society, this thesis
argued that the low birth rate is an outcome from the systemic problem that occurs when
the factors discussed in this paper occur simultaneously in society.
Internal Factors
The ideal gender model and the effect of personal relationships are examples of
internal, individual factors that influence a woman’s decision about childbearing. What if
Aiko’s boyfriend was more progressive or family-minded and was willing to actively help
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raise their family in equal partnership? Would the couple then move forward with getting
married and starting a family? The research from this thesis indicates that a society that
encourages couples to lessen the gendered division of labor would be more likely to
achieve a sustainable birth rate.
Redefining the ideal female gender model in Japan would be no easy task.
According to Cargill and Sakamoto, “Japan traditionally has been a conservative society
in terms of gender equality, with a male-breadwinner model. Husbands were expected to
provide for their family and wives served as homemakers taking care of the children.” 201
While the term “good wife, wise mother” is not used so frequently to describe Japanese
women today, the conservative notion remains. 202 The remnants of this conservative belief
can be seen in the sentiments of some politicians and media figures, who blame women for
the population decline and criticize them for not fulfilling the female gender ideal by
labeling them “loser dogs,” and “parasite singles.” 203
The ideal gender model emphasizes the importance that women should place on
being a caregiver, not only to their husbands and children, but parents, as well. Because of
this, a woman’s personal relationships may be a contributing factor in her decision about
childbearing that is counteracting the intense pressure to conform to the ideal gender
model. The burden of caregiving to husband, parents, in-laws, and potential children that
is expected of women is great enough to discourage women from having children, and in
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some cases from getting married in the first place, as seen in the imaginary scenario with
Chihiro and Aiko. 204
As more women choose not to or are unable to fulfill the idealized gender role,
women in popular media are being represented in alternative roles at higher rates. More
often, female characters are shown as single, in their thirties, and focusing on their careers
as seen in Last Cinderella and Fear and Trembling, demonstrating the increasing frequency
of these lifestyles. 205 These alternative characters, and the women who lead similar lives
in the real world, are still subject to criticism and are encouraged to seek the protection of
motherhood to avoid the public reproach. 206
External Factors
Women are not always choosing to forgo the idealized gender role of wife and
mother, but sometimes have that choice made for them. The hurdles to achieving marriage
and motherhood sometimes prove too great to overcome, leading women away from the
idealized female gender role, as shown in Aiko’s story. Aiko saw the struggles that Chihiro
went through in balancing work and family, with Chihiro’s career eventually losing out,
and Aiko decided to postpone marriage. Rather than blame women for the low birth rate,
as some critics do, Holloway suggests that “attempts to address the issue of the declining
birth rate need to consider a complicated set of issues, some structural and some related to
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discourses about work and parenting.” 207 The result of this systemic issue is that both men
and women are getting married at older ages, if at all. As stated in previous chapters,
delayed marriage is a contributing feature to the declined birth rate. 208
Economic and institutional influences are among the most reported reasons for later
or unrealized marriage and children. While improving the status of both national and
personal economies, women who remain in the workforce are the subject of criticism for
not having children, despite the conditions that place women in an either-or situation in
choosing between work and family. 209 Conversely, women who leave the workforce to
have children are upholding the ideal gender model by becoming mothers but are also
aware of the penalty incurred to their personal economy, as seen in Chihiro’s situation from
the imaginary scenario. Not only is the direct cost of raising children significant, but the
loss of potential income caused when mothers leave the workforce must also be taken into
account. The decision to choose between a personal life and professional pursuits, and the
lack of compatibility between the two, contributes to the lack of population growth and has
built the fork in the road of women’s lives between the idealized and alternative female
gender roles.
This course of life expectation of choosing between work and family for today’s
generation of young women in Japan is adequately summarized by Ofra Goldstein-Gidoni:
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Growing up in the midst of the economic bubble, they nevertheless
developed a hedonistic lifestyle and were known as the Hanako tribe
[literally, “flower children,” and is another term that denotes the perceived
irresponsibility of this group]. Then again, as we saw, upon marriage these
same women readily accepted the more frugal lifestyle of their modelhousewife mothers as they followed the standard life plan working as OL
[Office Ladies] and quitting their jobs upon marriage. 210
Current corporate environment limits a person’s involvement in their family life, driving
the division of labor between parents and promoting idealized gender roles for both men
and women. 211 Women are excluded from the labor force and men are excluded from a life
with their families, which was also seen in Holloway’s story of the frustrated mother
Chihiro. A large portion of Chihiro’s frustration stemmed from this division of labor. If
corporate environment is a reflection of the larger condition of women, addressing gender
inequality will aid in equalizing the status of men and women in Japan at home and in the
office. Tending to this issue will allow for both a growth in the economy through more
active participation by women in the workforce, and a growth in the population through
more active participation of men in childrearing. Although the Japanese government has
acknowledged that childbirth is a matter of individual choice, government and corporations
have the greatest influence on the lives of the Japanese citizens, and therefore should be
the leaders of this change. This change should not focus on improving population, but on
removing impediments that adversely influence its citizens’ lives.
To its credit, the Japanese government has worked to improve the lives of women
in the home and in the office. 212 However, despite the government’s effort to provide
210
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economic support for parents of young children and address other concerns that prevent
population growth, the government has been unable to adequately deal with gender equality
in the corporate world. 213 Holloway commented that persistent gender discrimination
against women in the workplace has worked to motivate women “to struggle harder at work,
thus delaying marriage and resulting in declining birth rates.” 214 It is not a matter of aiding
working mothers, but rather restructuring corporate design to become more gender neutral,
allowing mothers and fathers to take an equally active role at home and in the office.
Final Remarks
Japan will need to blur the line dividing gender roles in order to boost marriage
rates, improve the birth rate, and curb the decline in Japan’s total population that is foreseen
in the coming decades. The dichotomy between the male and female idealized gender roles
has long been socially acceptable and is reinforced through corporate environment and
social practices. The results of the contrasting roles are evident in the fact that “couples are
meeting one another at older ages, the length of courtship has lengthened, and the trend of
later marriage has further strengthened.” 215 The prevalence of delayed marriage has taken
a toll on the national birth rate, and shows that men are having as difficult a time of finding
a partner and having children as women.
Further research is needed on the views of both men and women and what they
view as social and structural obstructions to leading a fulfilling life. This thesis focused on
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the impact of a gendered society on women and their decision about childbearing. Further
research could potentially prove that the gendered nature of society in Japan influences
men’s decision of whether or not to have children in equal but different ways. Recently,
the Japanese government outlined a policy that encourages male participation in the
household, which this thesis indicates is a step in the right direction.
It is important to view the low birth rate as a systemic issue and as the responsibility
of society as a whole. If Japan continues to firmly uphold the ideal gender model, the birth
rate will not improve, and all of the warnings from scholars of economic debt and
predictions of population decline will likely come true. The decline in the birth rate should
not be the sole responsibility of women, but should be looked at as a national concern with
a national solution. Unless Japan is able to enact some kind of social change that allows
more similarities between the roles of men and women, it is unlikely that there will be an
improvement to the birth rate. Thus, Japan must bridge the gap between gender ideals and
equalize the status of men and women in order to achieve an improvement in the birth rate.
In order to achieve this equilibrium, Japan must institute strong pro-fertility public policies
and encourage a change in social mentality that is more accepting of working mothers and
caregiving fathers. In time, greater gender equality can be achieved, which will inevitably
stabilize the birth rate.
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